(Cambridge Concise Histories) Jerzy Lukowski, Hubert Zawadzki - A Concise History of Poland-Cambridge University Press (2006)

In October 1768, the exasperated Ottoman Porte declared war. It had long feared that Russia was set on reducing the Commonwealth to a supply base for a future reckoning with Turkey. The conflict brought Russia an almost unending string of military and naval victories. The peace of Kuchuk Kainardji of June 1774 was a dreadful humiliation for the Turks, not only costing them territory, but forcing them to abandon their lordship over the Crimea. Conducted over distances almost unimaginable in western Europe, the triumphant campaigning imposed a massive strain on Russia. It was to provoke the great Pugachev revolt. The resources to crush the guerrillas of Bar were not there. Neither Poniatowski nor the Czartorvskis were willing to assist the Russians; on the contrary, they hoped to use the Confederacy to secure, at the very least, a reversal of Russia’s guarantee; even to escape its clutches altogether.

Russia’s thrusts into the Danube basin alarmed Austria. Austria’s ally and Turkey’s friend, France, was equally anxious to roll back the Russian advance. France, Austria and Turkey each gave greater or lesser degrees of support to the Barists. The resulting tensions were brilliantly exploited by Frederick of Prussia. Russian power, which had so nearly destroyed hint during the Seven Years War, had come as a shock. In April 1764, he had formed an alliance with Catherine and had seconded her activities in Poland. He appreciated that Russia’s was the dominant role in Poland. He loyally (if querulously) supported Catherine’s Turkish war with financial subsidies. Wary of direct military involvement, he realized that he could yet draw profit from the conflict. He constantly warned Russia that immoderate expansionism would provoke the Habs-burgs. That, he claimed, would draw' in their ally France - a new front would thus be opened up 111 western Europe, engulfing the whole continent in an uncontrollable conflagration. It was disinformation of the highest order - neither Austria nor France was in any condition to fight a major war. But it enabled him to achieve his ends. Catherine, egged on by advisers who saw in grabbing Polish lands opportunities for personal profit, was persuaded that an apocalyptic escalation could be averted only by desisting from outright gains in the Balkans. Instead, Russia should seek ‘compensation’ from the original cause of the trouble, the Rzeczpospolita.

Border of territories annexed by Russia, Prussia, Austria in 1772 (First Partition) Border of territories annexed by Russia and Prussia in 1793 (Second Partition) Border of territories annexed by Russia, Prussia, Austria in 1795 (Third Partition)

Map 5 The l’oltsh-I.ithtumian Commonwealth in the eighteenth century.

Of course, Austria, too, had to be pacified - by taking matching territory from Poland; the disadvantage that Habsburg expansion would confer on Prussia could be countered only if Russia allowed its faithful ally to take its ‘share of the cake’.

Russia had had its eyes on the Lithuanian lands west of the Smolensk area since the 1740s. Catherine’s territorial guarantee of 1768 was elastically warded. And while the empress had never intended to share Poland with anyone (least of all Frederick), many in St Petersburg were persuaded that the road of all-round compensation offered the best exit from the imbroglio. Russia would, after all, still control what remained of Poland.

The precipitating factor was Austrian annexation of small strips of Polish highlands along the rugged Carpathian border. Frederick remorselessly played up the extent of this petty territorial larceny, warned of (non-existent) French preparations for war and, by 1 772, had persuaded the Russians that a deal had to be cut. On 5 August, three bilateral conventions signed between Russia, Austria and Prussia in St Petersburg gave Catherine the territories along the headwaters of the Dvina and Dnieper; the Austrians received extensive lands along the upper Vistula and San rivers; and Frederick finally obtained Polish Prussia - without Danzig, deemed too valuable by Catherine to deliver to her all-too-clever friend. Even so, in economic terms, he was the biggest gainer, seizing Poland’s most valuable lands and the economic jugular of the Vistula (which he proceeded to squeeze for all he could for the rest of his reign). Practical measures of occupation began in April 1772, in anticipation of the final agreements. iMost Poles were astonished - rumours of Partition had circulated for years; their own kings had warned them of their likely fate. The protection so long afforded them by Cod and the European balance had finally run its course.