(Cambridge Concise Histories) Jerzy Lukowski, Hubert Zawadzki - A Concise History of Poland-Cambridge University Press (2006)

Polish traditionalists and republicans resented Napoleon’s authoritarianism, and the Continental System accentuated further the structural weakness of Polish agriculture. Nevertheless, in contrast to Spain or Germany, the national movement in Poland became associated with Napoleon, who by 1809 had forced two of the partitioning powers to relinquish a large proportion of their Polish possessions. Tsar Alexander’s belated attempts to lure the Polish leadership in Warsaw away from the Napoleonic alliance with tempting political and territorial offers failed; his half-baked schemes to restore a Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a rival to Napoleonic Poland fared no better. The Polish imbroglio inevitably contributed to the rapid deterioration of Franco-Russian relations between 18 i о and 1812. The duchy's leaders welcomed the war of 1812: the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland was solemnly proclaimed on 28 June and the recovery of Russia’s ex-Polish lands was regarded as certain, although in Lithuania there was a cautious rather than an enthusiastic response to the French invasion.

Napoleon’s disaster in Russia shattered Polish hopes and illusions. It was now Tsar Alexander’s turn to be the arbiter of Poland’s future, although to avoid weakening the new anti-Napoleonic coalition he initially refrained from making public his ambition to restore a Polish kingdom under his rule. In these ambiguous circumstances Prince Jozef Poniatowski felt he had no choice but to stay at Napoleon’s side; he died a hero’s death while covering the French retreat with his troops at the decisive battle of Leipzig (i A—19 October 1813). Immediately after Napoleon’s abdication on 6 April 1814, Alexander openly laid claim to the duchy of Warsaw, took the remnants of the Polish army under his protection, and authorized a reform committee in Warsaw to prepare the ground for a Romanov kingdom of Poland to which, he intimated to the Poles, he was willing in due course to add the western gnbcrnii. Although pro-Napoleonic sentiments remained strong in the duchy, many of its notables, actively encouraged by Czartoryski, accepted the tsar’s professed magnanimity as their country’s only hope. Even Košciuszko, that paragon of patriotic virtue, briefly left his Swiss exile to offer his services to Alexander.

The Anal outcome of the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) fell dramatically short of what had been Polish hopes and expectations. However, it was simply not possible in 1815 to restore an independent Poland with the frontiers of 1772. It was the Poles’ misfortune that the continental powers which had Anally toppled Napoleon happened to be the same states that had partitioned Poland. It was also plainly unrealistic to expect Russia to surrender the conquered duchy of Warsaw as well as all its gains in the partitions of Poland on the very morrow of its greatest military triumph since Peter the Great. At the same time, the Napoleonic presence in eastern Europe had revived Polish national aspirations to such an extent that it would have been difAcult to restore stability in this region without some concessions to the Poles. Among the peacemakers it was Tsar Alexander who appreciated this most, and recognized that Russia’s security in the west w'ould be increased by winning over the distraught Poles to his side. A constitutional Poland under his sceptre could also provide a pilot project for the reforms he still contemplated for the Russian Empire. On the other hand, Alexander’s insistence on having a free hand in arranging the future of a Polish state under his control met with strong international opposition and dominated the diplomatic struggles at the Congress.

Metternich and Castlereagh, the Austrian and British foreign ministers respectively, both feared the extension of Russian power in central Europe under whatever guise and would have preferred a simple partition of the duchy of Warsaw. In the end they had to accept most of Alexander’s Polish demands, although the tsar had to compromise by relinquishing his claims to Poznania, Torun (Thorn) and Krakow. As a result the so-called Congress Kingdom of Poland emerged 50 per cent smaller than the duchy of Warsaw. Indeed the lands of the former Polish-I.ithuanian Commonwealth remained fragmented after 1815 in a complex mosaic of six political-administrative units: Austria retained ‘Old’ Galicia; the contested city of Krakow became a republic under the protection of the three eastern powers; Prussia held on to West Prussia (its original gain of J772) and received Poznania as the quasi-autono-mous duchy of Posen; Russia’s Polish lands also consisted of tw'o

SCALE

'Congress' Kingdom of Poland, 1815 ('Vistula Land' after 1874)

Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznania), 1815-49

Galicia (included Krakow after 1846)

LRiga

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——— International borders 1815-1914 (except for Krakow)

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Map 7 Partitioned Poland, i8t 5-T914.