Command and Control

“we should be able to communicate two things”: Ibid., Annex A, p. 6.

“less than 1,000,000”: Ibid., Annex A, p. 3.

“The plan is designed for execution”: General Lemnitzer made these comments during a meeting with President Kennedy on September 13, 1961. Although these remarks were not directed specifically at Kaysen’s proposal, Lemnitzer had been sent it the previous week and did not like it. The quote comes from ”SIOP-62 Briefing,” p. 50.

“If you have to go, you want LeMay”: Quoted in “Bomber on the Stump,” Time, October 18, 1968.

“some portion of the Soviet… nuclear force”: Quoted in Sagan, “SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing,” p. 22.

about 16 long-range missiles, 150 long-range bombers, and 60 submarine-based missiles: See Steven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945–2000 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), pp. 241–47.

“while small percentage wise”: “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin, Annex A, An Alternative to SIOP-62,” p. 10.

“In thermonuclear warfare”: Ibid.

kill as many as 100 million Americans: Two months earlier, Kaysen had calculated how many American lives might be saved by a large-scale civil defense program. In the absence of bunkers and shelters, Kaysen found that the use of one hundred Soviet weapons against American cities would kill between 62 to 100 million people. The American population, at the time, was about 180 million. See “Carl Kaysen, Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Subject: Berlin Crisis and Civil Defense,” July 7, 1961, NSA, Appendix, p. 3.

a “rotten tooth which must be pulled out”: Khrushchev had made the comparison during his Vienna meeting with Kennedy in 1961. Quoted in “Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Germany and Berlin; Possible Visit by Khrushchev,” October 18, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 372.

“It’s not a very nice solution”: Quoted in Kempe, Berlin 1961, p. 379.

“Berlin developments may confront us”: Quoted in “Memorandum to General Lemnitzer, From Maxwell D. Taylor,” September 19, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA.

General Power expressed concern that Khrushchev was hiding: See “Memorandum of Conference with President Kennedy,” September 20, 1961, p. 130.

Power advocated an attack with the full SIOP: Ibid.

“The Western Powers have calmly resolved”: “Text of Kennedy’s Address to United Nations.”

“whenever we feel it necessary”: Quoted in Alfred Goldberg, Steven L. Rearden, Doris M. Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961–1965 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 162.

“with such a strike, we could in some real sense be victorious”: “Minutes of Oct. 10, 1961 Meeting,” October 10, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 489.

A. Selective nuclear attacks: “Letter from President Kennedy to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe (Norstad),” October 20, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), in ibid., p. 523.

American tanks were sent to Checkpoint Charlie: For a feel of the military standoff between American and Soviet armored forces, see Sydney Gruson, “Soviet Advance: 33 Vehicles Are Mile from Crossing Point Used by Americans,” New York Times, October 27, 1961; Sydney Gruson, “U.S. Tanks Face Soviet’s at Berlin Crossing Point,” New York Times, October 28, 1961; and Sydney Gruson, “U.S. and Russians Pull Back Tanks from Berlin Line,” New York Times, October 29, 1961; and Kempe, Berlin 1961, pp. 455–81.

The mushroom cloud rose about forty miles: For the story of the “King of All Bombs” by two of its designers, see Viktor Adamsky and Yuri Smirnov, “Moscow’s Biggest Bomb: The 50-Megaton Test of October 1961,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Fall 1994.

with enough force to be detected in New Zealand: See “Transit of Pressure Waves Through New Zealand from the Soviet 50 Megaton Bomb Explosion,” E. Farkas, New Zealand Meteorological Service, Nature, February 24, 1962, pp. 765–66.

“There was hardly a week”: Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 363.

just before dawn, SAC headquarters in Omaha lost contact: Sensors for the Bomb Alarm System had been installed at Thule but were not yet operational. For details of the Black Forest incident, see “History of Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1961,” pp. 27–29.

“any maniac at a US military base”: Quoted in Jerry T. Baulch, “Faulty Alert Never Reached Top Command,” Washington Post and Times Herald, April 4, 1962.