Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia

The sine qua non for a reassessment must be an acknowledgement that both Russian and Western policies toward post-Soviet Eurasia have reached a dead end. For Russia, that means recognition that the zero-sum approach to its neighbourhood has been costly in the extreme, risky and self-defeating. The recurrent resort to coercion, be it political, military or economic, has alienated countries that might otherwise have naturally been drawn to Russia. The US and the EU must acknowledge that, despite success in East Central Europe, further application of the solution of the 1990s – the extension of Euro-Atlantic institutions eastward toward the Russian border, but not across it – is no longer viable. This prefab paradigm, mechanical growth of pre-existing institutions without negotiating terms among all affected parties, including Russia, and without compromises, is now unworkable. Continuing with the status quo will perpetuate instability and poor governance in the states of the region and a long-term Cold War-like atmosphere in West–Russia relations. The Ukraine crisis that has been with us since 2014 amply demonstrates this reality.

One of the ironies of recent frictions is that at this juncture neither NATO nor the EU is in a position to offer full-scale membership to any of the In-Betweens. This would be the case even if there were no frozen conflicts in the region, and even if the In-Betweens met the standards of good governance, functioning markets and democratic practices required for either EU or NATO membership. NATO member states are at odds on extending security guarantees to countries that Russia habitually threatens and sometimes invades. The EU is in the deepest crisis of its existence, given the eurozone mess, economic torpor, unruly waves of migration from the Middle East and North Africa, terrorism and Brexit. With its survival in question, adding new members is not a priority.

Recognising the reality that the policy of institutional enlargement in post-communist Europe and Eurasia, its past successes aside, has run its course does not mean that the West must accept Russian domination of its neighbours. In fact, the further enlargement of Russia-led institutions in the region is not a plausible solution either, regardless of what policy the West adopts. Those already in the Russian institutional fold remain there either under duress or for lack of better options; most would likely run for the exits if they could.[58] There is little support anywhere else for the Russian blueprint for regional governance.

Western and Russian policymakers would also be well advised to rethink the geo-ideas that often underpin their policies. It is not tenable for the West to insist on the right of all countries to make their own choices while at the same time being unable or unwilling to grant them those choices (like NATO and EU membership) or to take responsibility for the consequences of choosing. The EU is poorly served by the pious assertion of normative hegemony – the inherent superiority of its systems and structures – in an area where that hegemony is contested, both by Russia and by the reform-allergic systems of the In-Betweens.[59] Russia’s concept of indivisible security often boils down to a yearning for an accord among great powers, Yalta-style, that would reinforce rather than remove divisions in the region. Such a deal would not work even if it were agreed to, which it will not be. The Kremlin’s idée fixe that Russia needs to be the leader of a pack of post-Soviet states in order to be taken seriously as a global power broker is more a feel-good mantra than a fact-based strategy, and it irks even the closest of allies.

The towel should also be thrown in on the geo-ideational shadow-boxing over the Russian assertion of a sphere of influence in post-Soviet Eurasia and the Western opposition to it. Would either side be able to specify what precisely they mean by a regional sphere of influence? How would it differ from, say, US relations with western-hemisphere states, or from Germany’s with its EU neighbours? Clearly there are differences, but they are rarely specified. Is it realistic to think that Russia, an order of magnitude weightier than the states at its doorstep, would have no influence over them? And is it reasonable to expect any country of Russia’s global significance to observe from the wings as geo-economic and geopolitical blocs closed to it gradually absorb many of the countries on its borders? As Charles Kupchan, who has served as the Obama administration’s senior National Security Council official for the In-Betweens, once wrote, ‘The United States would hardly sit by idly if Russia formed an alliance with Mexico and Canada and started building military installations along the US border.’[60]