Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia

Even if these broad criteria are satisfied, a great deal of tough negotiating would be unavoidable. It goes without saying that doing so under the current circumstances will be extremely difficult. But it is not impossible. The Helsinki Final Act, perhaps an even more ambitious undertaking, was hammered out in the mid-1970s, at the height of Cold War tensions.[62] Just as that document did not in itself end the Cold War, the negotiation we are foreseeing, even if it succeeds, could help to alleviate tensions but would not eliminate them completely. And with the In-Betweens present at the table, the ghosts of Yalta would not be awakened.

A necessary first step is for the West to seek explicitly a compromise along these lines as a matter of policy. Russia is unlikely to take this first step, in part because many in Moscow still feel spurned after Medvedev’s attempt in 2008–09. But it is worthwhile testing the proposition that Russia would respond positively to an offer of talks.

Taking that first step does not require the West to bow to Russian demands. The proposed bargain would require all parties to make painful compromises. The West would have to acknowledge that the model that worked so well in East Central Europe is not going to work for post-Soviet Eurasia. Russia would have to strictly adhere to the limits the new arrangements would impose on its influence and to forswear further military encroachment on its neighbours. At a more basic level, Moscow would have to accept that its neighbours are well and truly sovereign states and that they have to be treated as such, even when it is inconvenient to do so.

Fruitful talks on this set of issues are not just a way to create a modicum of great-power comity. Negotiating new institutional mechanisms for the regional architecture in post-Soviet Eurasia would give the countries of the region a more decent chance than they have had – discounting all the soaring oratory – at security, reform and prosperity. Pursuing the status quo of unbridled contestation is a recipe for continued insecurity, political dysfunction and economic backwardness within the region. We will see repetitions of ruinous scenes like the destruction of Donetsk’s Sergei Prokofiev International Airport, and maybe worse.

The uncomfortable truth is that today neither Russia nor the West believes that the other would be willing to accept a compromise. Those who rule Russia are convinced that the West will forever push to extend its reach right up to Russia’s borders, and even inside them. Many Western policymakers are convinced that Russia for its part is a predator state, absolutely committed to domination of its neighbours.

Sadly, neither of these threat perceptions is completely baseless. Those who hold them can rightly point to numerous reasons why the talks we propose might fail. But the frightening consequences of a lengthy confrontation more than justify an attempt to find agreement. Not making such an attempt – and thus ensuring a new cold war – would be the height of policy negligence. One cold war was enough.

MASTHEAD

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

First published January 2017 Routledge

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DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE Dr John Chipman

EDITOR Dr Nicholas Redman

EDITORIAL Alice Aveson, Jill Lally, Carolyn West

COVER/PRODUCTION John Buck, Kelly Verity

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