God's War: A New History of the Crusades

Alexius saw his interests as eternal: the benefit of the empire. Anything else was peripheral or secondary, not least remote Jerusalem. He probably minimized the importance of the reciprocal nature of his agreement with the crusaders, seeing them effectively as mercenaries; they regarded him as a lord with contractual obligations to preserve the interests of his vassals. When he was persuaded that the crusaders were doomed at Antioch in June 1098, Alexius preserved his strategy by withdrawing his own army from danger. For the crusaders, this withdrawal was inexplicable treachery from a lord whose help had been sworn. They, who had risked all so many times, failed to appreciate his caution. The shadow of Antioch fell deep over Graeco-Latin relations in the twelfth century, nowhere more black than in the pages of the eyewitness chroniclers who felt and experienced the betrayal in which dim light they re-evaluated all that had transpired between Alexius and the crusade leadership. It is small wonder that Anna Comnena was so frenetic in her attempts to exonerate Alexius from any suggestion of culpability over Antioch, for he had been caught out by that most politically damaging agent: events. If the westerners had been annihilated at Antioch, as common sense dictated they should have been, Alexius would have been vindicated. Unfortunately not only did they survive, they proceeded to win Jerusalem and return to tell their tale.

At the heart of the dispute lay the oaths sworn, which were solemn and serious. Despite the contrasting sensitivities locked into the descriptions of events at Constantinople, it appears that Alexius demanded and received from all the leaders except Raymond of Toulouse homage and fealty. They became the emperor’s vassals, promising to restore to imperial rule all lands, towns and castles they captured which had formally belonged to the empire. This is effect meant lands lost in the relatively recent past: even Raymond of Toulouse, who became most protective of the relationship with Alexius, considered towns in Syria beyond Antioch, such as al-Bara, beyond the remit of the agreement.⁵¹ In return, Alexius promised help for the crusaders. Some tried to argue that he had promised to join the march to Jerusalem, but this probably represents a post-Antioch gloss. Raymond of Aguilers, a very hostile source, stated that Alexius ruled out his personal involvement. More probable was a guarantee of military aid, supplies and advice, as well as promises to protect the crusaders’ rear and assist reinforcements. The importance of these arrangements was underlined by Alexius’s insistence at the crusaders’ Asiatic base at Pelekanum just before they left for the march across Anatolia that even lesser lords took the oath. The one exception was Raymond of Toulouse, who insisted on swearing an oath more acceptable to Provençal practice, that ‘he would not, either through himself or through others, take away from the emperor, life and possessions’.⁵² Yet he abided by his obligations more faithfully than his colleagues, perhaps because Alexius had taken special pains to establish good relations with him after their sticky introduction.

The legal aspects of the agreements struck by Alexius and the western leaders were less important than the political implications. Only by becoming Alexius’s vassals could they extract necessary help. For Bohemund, subservience offered an opportunity for self-advancement; he proposed to Alexius that he be created Domestic of the East, effectively commander of the imperial forces in Asia and, in consequence, commander-in-chief of the crusade.⁵³ Alexius temporized but did not reject his offer of service outright. That Bohemund came up with the idea exposes the nature of his ambition; he wanted leadership; he wanted land. Alexius was not to know the extent to which Bohemund was determined to have both without any ties of vassalage. His whole career to date had made the Norman wish to dispense with overlords. Yet for the present, Alexius suited his case.

Initially, whatever the details, the treaties of Constantinople worked. Relations between western leaders, not least Bishop Adhemar, with the Greeks were good. Nicaea reverted to imperial control after its capture in June 1097 despite Alexius’s absence. A Byzantine division accompanied the army eastwards towards Antioch, under an experienced commander, Tatikios, a safe choice as a Turkish eunuch of unavoidable loyalty to the emperor rather than a Greek nobleman who could have harboured imperial longings of his own. Cities captured on the way, such as Comana, were indeed restored to Greek lordship. Optimism, if judged by a cheerful letter Stephen of Blois wrote to his wife from Nicaea on 24 June 1097, was high: ‘the army of God’ was looking forward to reaching Jerusalem in five weeks – ‘unless Antioch holds us up’.⁵⁴ Urban’s plan seemed to be working.

2. Asia Minor and Syria 1097–99

4