Knowledge And Decisions

One of the functions of the “publish or perish” policy of many universities is that it forces faculty members to sort and label themselves by exhibiting their professional abilities before their peers. It is not necessarily publication, as such, that is rewarded but rather that the sorting and labeling of scholarly ability is facilitated by publication. A string of mediocre publications may in fact be damaging to the individual, though valuable to the profession in sorting and labeling its members. Those who cannot meet even the minimum standards to be published in any scholarly journal obviously fall at the bottom of the sorting categories. In addition, there is a hierarchy of standards among the many academic journals in any given field, and some articles and books are judged more impressive than others by their scholarly audience.

Those academics with substantial ability and little desire to publish may be “underrated” by this system, but this reflects in part the high cost which their reticence imposes on institutions which must sort and label faculty members by some system for the apportionment of rewards. If those with such reluctance to publish are willing to forego the reward in order to avoid the bother, it may be a perfectly rational result for both the institution and the individual. The question of the relative weight of publication and other factors — teaching, administrative responsibilities, etc. — is a different question. The “publish or perish” policy implies only that scholarly ability is one essential characteristic that must be sorted and labeled.

The general social benefits of sorting and labeling must be sharply distinguished from the differential gains of those judged favorably or those who interact with favorably judged individuals. Sorting and labeling does not in itself change the characteristics of the people, activities, or things that are sorted and labeled. The differential gains of the “winners” are offset by the corresponding disadvantages of the “losers.” General social gains come from the greater ease of matching individuals and circumstances, so as to maximize benefits and minimize costs. Just as there is a greater demand for canned goods as a whole when they are individually labeled than when the labels have been washed off, so there is a greater demand for a labor force whose individual characteristics are known to some degree than when every employment decision has a wide penumbra of uncertainty about it. Even the “losers” in a sorting process may end up better off than they would have been without sorting. It is not a zero-sum process. Those social classes or ethnic groups whose behavior patterns are offensive to others may find a more sympathetic reception among neighbors who share their values and priorities. For purposes of understanding the value of sorting and labeling, it is unnecessary to agree with any particular set of values as to what is a “better” or “higher” standard. It is enough that there are different values, so that sorting people out can improve everyone’s position by their own respective values.

THE FINENESS OF SORTING

Finer sorting categories are not always preferable, even in those cases where they are available at no additional cost. Contrast the situation of “group punishment” for individual misconduct, as in small military units, with group punishment in countries where family honor is a paramount consideration. When a misdeed is committed by some unknown member of a given platoon or squad, the military authorities may choose to punish the whole platoon or squad, merely as a result of the high cost of acquiring knowledge of the individual culprit — especially in cases where the other members of the unit know who the culprit is, and will punish or control him socially or otherwise, even though they might not be willing to tell on him to the authorities. However, in countries where family honor is sacred, the whole family may be punished by shame, even though everyone knows the identity of the particular individual who was guilty of the misdeed. In the latter case, larger sorting categories (the family) are used even though finer categories (the individual) are available at no additional cost. The social purpose is not so much retrospective justice as prospective control. Individuals’ conduct can be controlled more effectively by those most intimately familiar with them than by public institutions. The cost of knowledge is far cheaper to family members than to either policemen or to courts, who must filter documentable allegations through rules of evidence, losing much knowledge in the process. Moreover, the range of sanctions are far more finely graduated in the family, and can be invoked in advance of any wrongdoing by raising the child to feel guilt or pride in behavior that would reflect shame or honor on the family.