Mao: The Unknown Story

STALIN CLEARLY decided that if he allowed Mao stewardship over even a limited slice of turf his own power would be eroded. So when Liu Shao-chi visited Russia that summer and delicately broached the subject by asking Stalin whether China could join the Cominform, he got a taste of the Master at his slyest. “I think it is not really necessary,” Stalin replied. China should, instead, be “organising a union of Communist parties of East Asia.” But this seeming confirmation of his earlier offer was followed at once by: “Since the USSR is a country situated both in Europe and Asia, it will participate in [this] union.” The Master was not backing off at all.

As before, Stalin served up sharp warnings to Mao by arresting a whole string of operatives who had been in China. While Liu was in Moscow, many of the key Russian agents who had been with Mao followed Borodin into the torture cells: Mao’s GRU doctor, Orlov, was recalled and savagely tortured by KGB chief Viktor Abakumov in person. Orlov was accused of links with “the American and Japanese spy” Mao. Orlov’s arrest was signaled to Mao, as the Russians approached Shi Zhe, Liu’s interpreter and Mao’s assistant, and asked him to inform on Orlov. These were signals that Stalin was preparing the ground to denounce Mao as a spy or a Titoist if it became opportune to do so.

Stalin was baring his fangs. But Mao was not scared, and flexed his muscles on an issue of great importance to him: the first international Communist gathering scheduled to be held in his new capital, Peking. This was a huge trade union conference, which would be the springboard for putting Mao on the world map, as it covered not only the whole of Asia, but also Australasia, an advanced capitalist continent. It was also highly political, more like an international conference of Communist parties than a trade union gathering. Stalin tinkered with the idea of blocking it, or moving the venue, but Mao had Liu insist that it “should be held in China at the scheduled time.” Liu promised that it “would not carry out any work of organization,” meaning that Mao would not try to exploit it to set up his own international network.

When the conference opened, on 16 November 1949, Mao had just founded his regime, on 1 October. In his keynote speech, Liu proclaimed “the Mao Tse-tung road,” and did not mention Stalin, or the Russian model, once. The theme of the conference was seizing power via the “Mao Tse-tung road” throughout Asia — and beyond: “The road that the Chinese people have followed is the road that the peoples of many colonial and semi-colonial areas should traverse …” Liu was categorical: “It is impossible for the revolutionary … people in such areas to avoid taking [this] road … [and] it will be wrong if they do so.” “Armed struggles,” he said, “should be the principal form of struggle.”

This was strong stuff, and what followed showed how much headway Mao had made. When the Russian delegate complained that Liu’s speech was “ultra-left,” Stalin denounced his own man as “a turncoat.” The hapless delegate, Leonid Solovyov, was obliged to admit error at a meeting chaired by Mao. This was a first for Mao — a senior Russian apologizing to him in front of his colleagues. Mao then grandly asked Stalin to “pardon” Solovyov.

Even bolder, Mao reneged on his commitment that there would be no organizational follow-up to the conference. On 23 November, Liu Shao-chi announced that a Liaison Bureau would be set up, in Peking, through which the participating countries “can form their ties.” Mao was gearing up to give orders to foreign Reds. Stalin let it pass.

Mao knew the cMaster was not going to swallow all this lying down. Some punishment was sure to result. But he now owned China, and with it a quarter of the world’s population. He had significantly increased the scope and weight of the Communist camp as a whole. Stalin could not afford to disown him. Mao fully intended to force Stalin to help him advance his own global ambitions.

In America, the CCP had its own people operating inside the US Communist Party, and a powerful intelligence network with access to information unavailable to the Russians. When Moscow denounced US CP head Earl Browder, an old China hand, whose secret “China Bureau” had close links to Mao, Mao had very publicly continued to call him “comrade.”

Mao learned from Stalin’s duplicity about conducting an open, even apparently friendly relationship with a government while secretly trying to overthrow that same government. When he came to power, he was to copy Stalin in his dealings with other countries.