Mao: The Unknown Story

It was Mao who had made it possible for Stalin to draw this conclusion. America was losing more aircraft than it could afford militarily, and more men than the public would accept. Altogether, the US lost well over 3,000 aircraft in Korea, and could not replenish these losses fast enough to feel safe about being able to fight a two-front war simultaneously in Asia and Europe. Equally important, the US lost some 37,000 dead.

Although the American death toll was only a small percentage of the Chinese, democratic America could not compete with totalitarian China when it came to body bags. As America headed into a presidential campaign in 1952, support in the US for continuing the war stood at only about 33 percent, and the Republican candidate, ex-General Dwight D. Eisenhower, campaigned on the slogan “I Will Go to Korea,” which was widely taken to mean ending the war.

China’s role in taking on the US gave Chou the cards to shoot for the moon, and he asked the Master for no fewer than 147 large military-related enterprises, including plants to produce warplanes and ships, 1,000 light tanks per year, with one factory for medium tanks to be ready within five years.

Stalin prevaricated, responding with platitudes (“China must be well armed, especially with air and naval forces”; “China must become the flagship of Asia”). But he never signed Chou’s list.

Then there was the question of turf. Stalin had been doling out parts of Asia to Mao since he had begun to think about the war in Korea. Mao had extruded tentacles into half a dozen Asian countries stretching from Japan (the Japanese Communists had come to Peking in spring 1950 to prepare for armed action in coordination with the Korean War) to the Philippines (where the US had strategic bases) and Malaya, where a sizable, and largely ethnic Chinese, insurgency was fighting British rule. In Southeast Asia, Burmese Communist insurgent forces had been moving towards the Chinese border to link up with China to receive supplies and training, just as Ho Chi Minh’s army had done in Vietnam. One evil harbinger who was soon to come to China for training was the future leader of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot.

In September 1952, Chou talked to Stalin about Southeast Asia as if its fate were to be entirely decided by Peking, and the Chinese army could just walk in if Peking so wished. The minutes of their meeting on 3 September record that Chou: “says that in their relations with Southeast Asian countries they are maintaining a strategy of exerting peaceful influence without sending armed forces. He offers the example of Burma … The same in Tibet. Asks whether this is a good strategy.” Chou was treating Burma in the same vein as Tibet. Stalin replied wryly: “Tibet is part of China. There must be Chinese troops deployed in Tibet. As for Burma, you should proceed carefully.” But Stalin immediately added, confirming that Burma was Mao’s: “It would be good if there was a pro-China government in Burma.” (Stalin monitored Burma closely through his ambassador, the long-time liaison in Yenan, Vladimirov.)

Mao was now planning to form his regional conglomerate, using a “Peace Congress” of the Asia — Pacific region scheduled to convene in Peking. This was on Chou’s agenda for his talks with Stalin. Stalin was obliged to acknowledge that China should play “the principal role.” That he was not at all pleased can be seen from what followed. Chou asked “what specific actions” the Russian delegation would take, which was a subtle invitation for Stalin to confirm that the Russians would not grab leadership. Stalin replied sarcastically with one word: “Peace.”

Undeterred, Chou forged on to say that during the imminent Soviet Party Congress Liu Shao-chi would like to meet Asian Communist leaders. This was a way of trying to secure Stalin’s blessing for Mao to take charge of Asian parties, but dragging endorsements out of the Master was like getting water out of a stone. First mentioned were the Indonesians. The minutes record:

CHOU EN-LAI … asks whether it would be timely to discuss party issues in Moscow with them.

STALIN says that it is difficult to tell yet …

CHOU EN-LAI reports that the Japanese should arrive, and it is likely they will also want to discuss party issues.

STALIN answers that older brothers cannot refuse their younger brothers in such a matter. He says that this should be discussed with Liu Shao-chi …

CHOU EN-LAI points out that Liu Shao-chi intends to bring with him appropriate material, in order to discuss a number of questions.

STALIN notes that if the Chinese comrades want to discuss these issues, then of course we will have no objection, but if they do not want it, then we will not have to discuss anything.

CHOU EN-LAI answers that the Chinese comrades will definitely want to talk.