Moscow, December 25, 1991

According to Robert Gates, head of the CIA, there is no feeling in the administration on this historic day that the United States has helped destroy the USSR, nor any sense of winning. He does not think that George Bush is about to declare victory in the Cold War. He worries, however, that this “cataclysmic” event has unleashed forces pent up for seventy years, and they have yet to see, much less understand, the full consequences.

Brent Scowcroft believes that Gorbachev deserves a less ignominious exit. Bush’s national security adviser is stunned that the end of an era of enormous and unrelenting hostility has come in an instant, and most incredibly of all without a single shot being fired. Looking back, he takes “pride in our role in reaching this outcome…. We had worked very hard to push the Soviet Union in this direction, at a pace which would not provoke an explosion in Moscow, much less a global confrontation.”¹¹

Colin Powell, who as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has made a number of trips to Moscow, reckons Gorbachev hoped to revive a dying patient “without replacing its Marxist heart.” He believes that the end of the Cold War was made possible because of the bold brand of leadership practiced by Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan. “That Christmas Day, the unimaginable happened,” he wrote. “The Soviet Union disappeared. Without a fight, without a war, without a revolution. It vanished… with the stroke of a pen.”¹²

Chapter 25 DECEMBER 25: NIGHT

Boris Yeltsin can hardly bring himself to look at the television screen in his office as Gorbachev begins to speak. He has not been provided with a copy of the text, and he does not know what the outgoing occupant of the Kremlin is about to say. Within a minute, however, the Russian president has worked himself up into a fury. Gorbachev does not say he is resigning, only ceasing his activities. He implicitly criticizes Yeltsin for “controversial, superficial, and biased judgments” and for the way the Commonwealth of Independent States was created without the “popular will.” And he promises to do everything in his power “to ensure that the Alma-Ata agreements bring real unity to our society”—as if he had any role in ensuring anything any more!

As Gorbachev proceeds to justify his actions in office, Yeltsin snaps, “Switch it off. I don’t want to listen any more.” He tells Gennady Burbulis to bring him a transcript. Grachev sends the text over to Burbulis after Gorbachev has finished. As Yeltsin reads through it, he expresses exasperation at what he considers to be a self-serving political manifesto rather than a farewell to politics. Gorbachev is taking credit for all the political and spiritual freedoms Russian people now enjoy. He does not once mention Boris Yeltsin by name or even by title. He gives Yeltsin no credit for the defeat of the attempted coup against him in August. Nor does he wish the Russian president well as his successor. Perhaps he should have ordered Gostelradio to pull the plug on the broadcast as he had been tempted to do.¹

Now, as so often in the past, the touchy Siberian allows pique to dictate his actions. He refuses to go to Gorbachev’s office to receive the nuclear suitcase as agreed two days ago. It must be brought to him, he blusters.

Yeltsin picks up the telephone and calls Marshal Shaposhnikov, who is waiting in an office on the second floor of the Senate Building for the summons to proceed to Gorbachev’s cabinet for the historic transfer. With him are a number of generals, gathered to witness and facilitate the important and symbolic exchange.

“Yevgeny Ivanovich,” says Yeltsin, “I can’t go to Gorbachev. You go by yourself.”

“Boris Nikolayevich, this is a very delicate matter,” the marshal protests. “It would be desirable that we go together. What is more, I’m not sure if Gorbachev will transfer all the [nuclear] property to me by myself.”

“If there are complications, call me,” says Yeltsin. “We will discuss other options for the transfer.”