Moscow, December 25, 1991

Shaposhnikov is not altogether surprised. He, too, is exasperated by Gorbachev. Watching the farewell address, he found himself reflecting that the president has overstayed his welcome and that he should have resigned after the coup.² How much hope there had been for the Soviet Union when Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party in 1985! “He was young, modern, energetic, with many advantages over his colleagues. He introduced perestroika, glasnost, democratization, all human values. But the further it went the more doubts there were, and disillusions. The main thing—life was not becoming better. The economy continued to deteriorate, and the political situation was developing at such speed that the whole system started to fall apart.” Having defeated the putschists without Gorbachev, he believes the citizens of the USSR simply stopped responding to him. Many people don’t want the Soviet Union to fall apart, he knows. Shaposhnikov’s wife certainly does not want new borders created. She has been worrying that they will have to go abroad in future to visit their daughter who lives in Odessa, now in independent Ukraine. But they are all sick of the Soviet system, and they just don’t want Gorbachev anymore.

The marshal takes his briefcase with the transfer documents, mounts the stairs to the floor above, and enters Gorbachev’s suite. He waits ten minutes in the cramped reception room, along with the two colonels who are assigned to accompany the nuclear suitcase and who are perched side by side on the sofa, so ubiquitous and inscrutable that some of Gorbachev’s staff have stopped noticing them. Their gift for looking inconspicuous has frequently impressed Palazchenko, who remembers them sitting almost always silently but with an oddly inexpressive yet dignified look.

When Gorbachev calls him in, Shaposhnikov sees that the chemodanchik is resting on the ex—Soviet president’s desk. He finds Gorbachev holding up quite well but noticeably ill at ease. The marshal relates his instructions, that Yeltsin is not coming and that he is to take the case to Yeltsin.

Gorbachev thinks the situation is “rather comical, not to say stupid.” In this final confrontation, however, he has the upper hand. He is in possession of the object that the Russian president needs to legitimize his grab for power. Let him come and claim it. Gorbachev no longer has to answer any summons from his rival. ³

There is an impasse. Yeltsin won’t come, and Gorbachev won’t budge. Both presidents must sign the transfer documents, and both must be satisfied that this procedure is done properly, in front of witnesses.

Told that Gorbachev will not hand over the suitcase, Yeltsin still refuses to honor the original agreement on the handover. Let Gorbachev bring it to him then, he growls. Gorbachev must come to his office, or to the neutral territory of the St. Catherine Hall, and deliver it to him there. St. Catherine Hall, with its vaulted ceilings and gold chandeliers, is where Gorbachev humiliated him four years ago, prompting Central Committee members to throw a “bucketful of filth” over him for daring to question the pace of perestroika. He instructs Burbulis to convey his demand to Gorbachev.

Gorbachev is indignant. “I was told he had refused to come, despite our agreement,” he later recalled in his memoirs. “It turned out that Yeltsin, together with his entourage, had listened to my televised speech and flown into a rage. After a while I was told that the Russian president proposed to meet on ‘neutral territory’—in the Catherine Hall, i.e. the part of the Kremlin where talks with foreign leaders were usually held…. Thus even in the first minutes after stepping down I was faced with impudence and lack of courtesy.” He believes that this derogation from their arrangement is not an isolated backlash of Yeltsin’s feelings of revenge but part of a policy of harassment he is conducting against him.

Grachev believes the “preposterous idea” of Gorbachev going to Yeltsin with the suitcase was suggested by one of his more belligerent advisers, when it became clear that Gorbachev was leaving office with dignity and with his head held high rather than as a vanquished foe. “Yeltsin wanted to show Gorbachev he was no longer superior to him. Yeltsin’s fury related to his feeling that it should be his day of triumph. In his presentation, however, Gorbachev made everybody realize the historic shift he had achieved. He was stepping down not as one defeated. Yeltsin felt he remained a secondary figure in the aura of Gorbachev and the success of perestroika. He must have realized that never in his life would he match his opponent.”

Shaposhnikov tries to break the deadlock. He suggests that Gorbachev sign the transfer papers and that one of the colonels brings them to the Russian president, and when Yeltsin confirms he has received the documents, Gorbachev can transfer the nuclear suitcase to Shaposhnikov, who will send it across to Yeltsin.