Moscow, December 25, 1991

In Madrid Gorbachev found his international colleagues more apprehensive than ever about his survival capacity. He blustered that Yeltsin was “rather easily influenced” by his entourage and not to take him too seriously. But his own demeanor gave the game away. James Baker found Gorbachev unfocused, acting like a drowning man who is looking for a life preserver. Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzalez urged Gorbachev to persist in his efforts, as Europe needed its two secure pillars, the European Community in the west and the Soviet Union in the east.

At a joint appearance of the Soviet and U.S. presidents, interpreter Palazchenko observed the skeptical, cold, and indifferent faces of the Americans, who once regarded Gorbachev as a top-caliber world leader but whom they now thought of as “already a goner.” As the conference ended, Bush bade Gorbachev good-bye with a patronizing pat on the back, saying, “You’re still the master!” ⁵

In an extraordinary tacit acknowledgment of the influence of the United States, the new Soviet foreign minister, Boris Pankin, traveling with Gorbachev, quietly asked James Baker to encourage the American president to persuade Yeltsin to preserve the Soviet foreign ministry.⁶

On the plane back to Moscow Gorbachev told Chernyaev, Palazchenko, and Grachev of his determination to succeed in forging a new union. The most pessimistic person on the plane, noted Palazchenko, was Raisa, who had “grave concerns” for the future.

She had every reason to be worried on her husband’s behalf. Nothing was certain. After his speech Yeltsin formed a new Russian government with himself as prime minister and two ultra-radical reformers, Gennady Burbulis and Yegor Gaidar, as deputy prime ministers. It began, with breathtaking audacity, to take over central institutions and to convert Soviet industry ministries into stock corporations subject to Russia, a process the demoralized Soviet government was too feeble to resist.

Ukraine forced the constitutional crisis to a head. Its leaders organized a plebiscite on independence to be held on December 1, 1991. Gorbachev assured everyone who would listen that Russia and Ukraine would not and could not separate, as the two nations were branches of the same tree. But if Ukraine opted for independence, as seemed likely, it would have to be either allowed by Moscow to break free or cajoled into a redesigned union. The alternative was war.

The possibility of war was taken seriously, especially in Kiev, and alarmist rumors appeared in the media. Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, Konstantin Masik, told Nezavisimaya Gazeta that “Yeltsin discussed with military leaders the possibility of a nuclear strike on Ukraine” to prevent the republic becoming a nuclear threat to Russia. The Russian information ministry protested vehemently to the newspaper that this was propaganda fomenting war, but editor Vitaly Tretyakov pointed out that the charge was not disavowed by Masik or his boss, Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk. The Russian government sent its legal counsel, Sergey Stankevich, to tell Tretyakov that the charge was wild and absurd. Yeltsin’s military adviser General Konstantin Kobets also dismissed the story as nonsense.⁷

Yegor Gaidar recalled that the leadership did not discuss plans for using nuclear means in the event of territorial disputes but acknowledged that perceptions were as important as facts.

Though the coup had failed, there was still talk of the military taking a role to enforce a new union. The prospect, and even the desirability, of such a drastic step was raised in mid-November by Gorbachev himself in conversation with Shaposhnikov.⁸ By the marshal’s account he was invited late at night to the Kremlin. Gorbachev revealed that he was worried that the Soviet Union was about to fall apart despite all his efforts, and “something needs to be done.” The Soviet president outlined options, one of which was, “You, the military, take power in your hands, put in place the government that is convenient to you, stabilize the situation and then step aside.”

“And then go directly to Matrosskaya Tishina with a song!” retorted the marshal, referring to the Moscow penitentiary whose name meant Seaman’s Silence, where some of the coup plotters were incarcerated. “We have had something similar in August already.”

“What are you talking about, Zhenya,” spluttered Gorbachev. “I’m not suggesting anything, I am just going through options, thinking aloud.”

The conversation came to an abrupt end. The idea of military intervention could have tragic consequences, wrote Shaposhnikov in his diary. “Yeltsin’s authority was unchallenged and he would have organized ferocious resistance to such a decision. Civil war could not be ruled out. Having imagined mountains of bodies and a sea of blood of my compatriots and my role as an executioner, I naturally did not support thoughts that were suggested by Gorbachev.”