Moscow, December 25, 1991

“One can’t exclude the possibility that Gorbachev was testing Shaposhnikov,” suggested Andrey Grachev years later, when asked about this encounter. “He was playing with several ideas. It was his responsibility to see what levers he could use. It was his duty constitutionally to save the Union.” But society was divided, and the Soviet president knew well that in the event any leader in his position tried to resort to these methods, people would think he was trying to save himself. “The principle ambition of Gorbachev was to introduce the idea of division of powers; otherwise he would be acting as a typical Soviet leader, Brezhnev or Stalin, and that would be a denial of what he was doing for six years,” said Grachev. He added that Gorbachev had dismissed any notion of force once, saying, “What should I do—open fire on the parliaments that I constructed?”⁹

Gorbachev would later give some credit for his decision not to ask the military to intervene to his reading of Margaret Mitchell’s novel Gone with the Wind, with its graphic description of the terrible losses and sacrifices of war.¹⁰

The prospect of keeping the USSR together diminished during three more meetings of the republics’ leaders that the Soviet president convened in November.

The first, on November 4, left Gorbachev hopeful. He had organized the event in such a way that for forty minutes of live television, viewers saw him warning the representatives of ten republics that they could “slide into the devil’s abyss” if they split up. They listened respectfully while the cameras were on. But afterward there was silence. Everyone eyed Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Grachev thought it was like the scene in The Jungle Book in which the pack waits for the confrontation between the two strongest wolves to find out which will be the leader. As it turned out, Yeltsin was in a conciliatory mood. He agreed on keeping an all-union foreign policy and armed forces. Gorbachev was jubilant. That in itself was a victory.

The second meeting, on November 14, however, would confirm his suspicions that the Yeltsin team, steered by Burbulis, had begun the methodical, step-by-step subversion and destruction of the process. And this time only seven republics attended. Ukraine was not among them.

Yeltsin arrived late. This was a tactic the Russian president often used to unsettle Gorbachev. Ordinarily Yeltsin was fastidious about time keeping, and he had always had the extraordinary ability to tell what the time was, to the minute, without looking at his watch.

He marched into the second-floor conference room and feigned anger about a report that Gorbachev had criticized Russia at a press conference over events in Chechnya, the rebellious Russian province that had declared independence. “Since you are criticizing Russia let me respond,” Yeltsin thundered. “Our new relations have lasted all of three months. Now they’re over.”

Gorbachev was stunned. The other leaders made excuses to go to the bathroom. Yeltsin gradually cooled down, and the meeting got started. They debated all day, discussing confederation models such as Switzerland and Canada. Gorbachev still wanted a union state; Yeltsin, a union of states. The difference was not semantic: The former preserved the country, while the latter meant dividing the USSR into a number of independent entities. Watching on the sidelines, Gorbachev’s aides were convinced the Russian leader was only playing for time and manipulating the process.

Before the coup the presidents of the republics had been reasonably respectful to Gorbachev. No longer. Korzhakov watched as “Gorbachev became very obedient, knowing that his power was ebbing away.” The draft treaty was watered down until it provided for a confederation in which each republic had the right to conduct foreign relations and create military units.

When walking round the table and gesticulating to make a point, Gorbachev accidentally knocked over the black Samsonite case containing the nuclear codes. It had been placed at arm’s length from him as if to remind the company of his status as commander in chief of the Soviet armed forces.

They eventually decided to initial a draft treaty for a “confederative union state” on November 25. When they emerged to meet the media in the lower hallway, Yeltsin and Gorbachev bantered with each other. Looking at his rival, Yeltsin said, “We don’t always understand you.” Gorbachev replied, “That’s all right, as long as you eventually catch on.”¹¹