Остракизм в Афинах

23. In the Conclusion specific results reached in all chapters and sections and stated above are briefly summarized. Then the sum definition of ostracism as an institution is given. Ostracism existed in some shape already in Archaic Greece, but by the beginning of the Classical period it took its final form. In this "classical" form, as it functioned in fifth-century B.C. democratic states, ostracism can be defined as politically motivated extrajudicial banishment from the polis of the most influential citizens, for a fixed period (10 years in Athens), without any deprivation of civil rights (including property right) and with subsequent full restoration of political rights. The banishment served as a «prophylactic» means and was exercised through the demos' vote in the assembly, using a special procedure (in Athens — with inscribed clay sherds as ballots).

Finally, the author attempts to give a general appraisal of ostracism. To be sure, there are such appraisals in preceding scholarly literature. Some of them are negative and critical (they seem to prevail); others pay more attention to positive and constructive features of the institution (they are less common, but we think them to be more justified). It is interesting in this connection, that among ancient writers, just as among modern researchers, there is no unity on that subject. Among ancient appraisals of ostracism there are also both positive (Plut. Aristid. 7) and negative (Andoc. IV. 3–6; Cic. Tusc. V. 105; De amie. 42; Nep. Them. 8; Aristid. 1; Cim. 3) ones. Most weighed, with proper consideration of both advantages and drawbacks of ostracism, are Aristotle's assessments (first of all, Pol. 1284a4 sqq,).

Generally, one can notice that two principal views of ostracism are possible: from the standpoint of an individual and from the standpoint of the citizen community, the collective body, the polis. And these views quite naturally prove to be in opposition to each other. An aristocratic personality under the conditions of democracy could evaluate ostracism but negatively, for it is to this personality that the institution struck a blow. For instance, Andocides' fourth oration is a manifestation of namely such an «individualist» appraisal of ostracism. Aristotle views ostracism from a different position: he proceeds from interests of the polis as a whole and, as a result, comes to the conclusion, that, however unsympathetic was the institution as such, it had certain necessity and rightfulness, as it, all its shortcomings notwithstanding, allowed to defend the Whole against «disproportion» of its parts. To translate to modern terms, ostracism resisted individualist trends, which tended to undermine the polis collectivism. Plutarch in his description of ostracism tried to combine both approaches to the problem: he pointed out that the «trial of sherds» had often proved to be beneficial for the citizen mass, as the institution alleviated envy and hatred to the leaders, and for the latter it was rather mild and not pernicious measure.

Aristotle's view of ostracism seems to have been more profound than any other view in antiquity. The philosopher grasped and described — surely in a language proper to his time — exceptionally important characteristics of the institution in question. The emergence of ostracism was possible only in the polis framework, moreover, only in definite political conditions, in the situation of struggle between individualist and collectivist trends. This theme was always urgent for the polis: Aristotle means it when he speaks about the «proportionality» parts of the Whole must have. Of the two trends mentioned, ostracism unquestionably embodied the collectivist one. And in its context ostracism was, beyond any doubt, rightful, logical, and constructive.

One more aspect should be noted when stating that ostracism was an outcome of polis conditions. In the public life of the polis, with its direct democracy and absence of mass media, immediate oral communication played a huge part: it is on this level that intercourse of political leaders, members of the elite, with the demos was effectuated. In such a situation the only really efficient means of defeating a political enemy was to make him leave the polis (through banishment, ultimately through execution). Only by such a way it was possible to prevent him from contacts with the citizen body. But on the other hand that means proved to work faultlessly: as soon as a politician found himself outside the polis territory (even if without any deprivation of rights, without atimia — and ostracism was the case), he lost all possibility to influence the political life. The institution of ostracism and the direct polis democracy turn out to have been interconnected inseparably.