The introduction identifies at which points and in what form reflections on the battle appear in the letters. It is a pity for the historian that the Prussians did not capture the courier immediately after the battle, but then again, reactions to the carnage needed time to take form and find their articulation after the initial shock.
(Self)-censorship has no practical influence on the letters: Russia had only minimal lustration of personal correspondence at this point, while the sensibility threshold was much higher at the time than in later periods. Nevertheless, many officers write openly about their inability to articulate their feelings in the wake of such extraordinary and shocking events. The real war differs a lot from their normative understanding of it and they often refer to the battle as carnage and butchery. At the same time, the younger officers present the events as a bloody «feast of Mars».
The personal accounts from this era demonstrate two realities in which officers existed: service on the one hand and private life on the other. In the latter, the individual interprets himself as a private person; in the former — as a «state» personality where «particularity» is inappropriate and is reduced to a minimum. The private sphere is distilled in the notion of
For Russian officers, the concept peace (
An evaluation of the material and economic side of officers’ lives follows: the letters are full of requests and instructions about running estates. Communications with home were essential for officers’ financial affairs: the letters constantly mention financial transfers and loans. The letters and other documents recreate the picture of everyday life of the Russian army on a foreign campaign.
At the same time, the extraordinary experience of the 1758 campaign altered attitudes and values within the army. The heavy losses, the looting of officers’ carriages, the difficult retreat, and the army’s isolation in hostile territory facilitated the evolution of an emotional community within the army. Judging by the letters, it fostered friendly and informal horizontal relationships. Such processes, however, usually presuppose mechanisms of exclusion: in our case, this took the form of distinguishing between «native Russians» and foreign officers as well as opposition between regimental, army and imperial identities on the one hand and national ones on the other. The latter comes across as simmering resentment towards «Lutherans» and self-differentiation of the «German officers» in the Russian imperial army.
It is typical for officers to portray what they have experienced in a supra-individual context where the battles serve as milestones in the biographies of empires and military glory denotes the degree of their maturity. Some compare Zorndorf to victories at Poltava (1709) and Villmanstrand (1741) and express pride in having stood up to «Fyodor Fyodorovich» himself, as Russian officers used to call Frederick the Great.
The letters also shed light on changes in the character and dynamics of the officers’ individual morals. The relationship between fear and honor is different from what the officer’s code will become later. Officers are not yet embarrassed to mention their fear in letters and it is more accepted in the collective Russian consciousness than in the Prussian army. The concept of courage at the time had more to do with following regulations and orders and less with acting bravely as an individual. The central motive for participating in warfare was career advancement, since taking part in a battle meant automatic promotion through the ranks.