Play Dead

Langel reported it to the animal shelter, who sent out someone to search for the stray dog and capture him but could not find him. Hawpe has just checked the back records of the shelter and located the call and dispatching of the shelter worker, to confirm that it was the same date. It was.

I argue that Langel should not be allowed to testify, because he was not on the list Hawpe provided, but it’s a halfhearted argument with no chance of success. Hawpe represents to the court that he did not know about Langel until yesterday afternoon, and he hadn’t confirmed it with the animal control department until early this morning.

Judge Gordon rules that Langel will be allowed to testify, and I enter a formal objection. He overrules me, and we head into court.

Hawpe’s first witness is Gerald Daniels, head of the Somerset County crime lab. Five years ago Daniels was the technician who handled the forensics on this case, and his promotion since then probably gives him additional credibility.

Not that he needs it. He gives a straightforward, professional analysis of the evidence. He describes the evidence collection on the boat, most notably the bloodstains on the floor and railing, and the positive DNA match to Stacy, based on hair samples from her brush in Richard’s house.

There isn’t any doubt that Daniels is qualified to render these conclusions, and no reason to think he would be deceptive. It is not particularly harmful to me, since I have not contended that Stacy was not on that boat or that she was not murdered.

My cross-examination is therefore short and narrowly focused. “Mr. Daniels, I would like to explore the scope of your investigation. So I’m going to ask you some questions, and I’d like you to answer based on what you can say with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. If you cannot speak with that certainty, please say so.”

“Yes, sir.”

“Thank you. Now, where on Stacy Harriman’s body did the blood on the boat come from?”

“I cannot determine that with any degree of scientific certainty,” he says.

“Who caused her wounds?”

“I can’t determine that, either.”

“Was Richard Evans conscious when Stacy Harriman was killed?”

“I don’t know.”

“Were the bloodstains placed where they were deliberately?” I ask.

“Questions like that are beyond the scope of my work.”

“Now I’d like to present a hypothetical. With Richard Evans unconscious, someone who had been hiding on the boat, or who had boarded it after it set sail, murdered Stacy Harriman and threw her body overboard. Is there anything in your work which could disprove that?”

“No, but…”

“Thank you.”

I made some rhetorical points with Daniels, but nothing that will stick. I still have not given the jury any reason to believe that someone other than Stacy and Richard was on that boat. Making the point that it is merely possible is just not going to do it.

Hawpe next calls Dr. Susan Coakley, professor of veterinary medicine at Cornell University. Dr. Coakley might be called a physical therapist for animals, and teaches the practice of physical rehabilitation through exercise. A lot of that is “water therapy” whereby the dogs swim under controlled conditions in a university pool constructed for that purpose.

Her basic testimony is that she believes it to be possible that a young, healthy golden retriever could have made the swim from the boat to shore that night. She does not claim to know it for a certainty but is quite adamant in considering it quite conceivable.

She reminds me of a few professors I had in law school. They considered their opinions to be incontrovertible fact and wore their arrogance proudly on their sleeves. I never got a chance to knock them down a peg, which is why I’m so looking forward to this cross-examination.

In truth, I need to go after her very hard, since if she cannot be shaken, then our “Reggie turned up alive” advantage no longer carries much weight.

“Dr. Coakley, when did you conduct your physical examination of Reggie?” Unless she’s the lowlife that broke into my house and kidnapped Reggie, I know that the answer to this question is “never.”

“I did not conduct an examination.”

“Pardon me?” I ask, betraying my surprise. Oh, the shock of it all.

“I did not conduct an examination on this particular dog.”

“Were you prevented from doing so?”

“No, it wasn’t necessary for what I was called upon to do.”

“I see. So you merely went over his medical records, X-rays, that kind of thing?”

“No, I did not have access to them,” she says.

“You were denied that access?”

“No, the records were not necessary for my work.”

“So the health of a dog is not relevant in determining if that dog could swim four miles in the ocean in a major storm?”

“I was operating under the assumption that he was healthy.”

“So if he were not healthy, that might change your opinion?” I ask.

“It might, depending on what was wrong with him.”