not yet represent a complete picture of pathocracy. Many local
leaders and adherents persist in their original convictions
which, albeit radical, strike them as serving the good of a much
larger proportion of formerly abused persons, not just a few
percent of pathocrats and the interests of a would-be world
wide empire.
Local leaders continue to think along the lines of social
revolution, appealing to the political goals they truly believe in.
They demand that the “friendly power” furnish them not only
the promised assistance, but also a certain measure of auton-
omy they consider crucial. They are not sufficiently familiar
with the mysterious “us-and-them” dichotomy. At the same
time they are instructed and ordered to submit to the dictates of
unclear ambassadors whose meaning and purpose are hard to
understand. Frustration and doubt thus grow; their nature is
ideological, nationalistic, and practical.
Conflict progressively increases, especially when wide cir-
cles of society begin to doubt whether those people allegedly
220
PATHOCRACY
acting in the name of some great ideology do in fact believe in
it. Thanks to experience and contact with the pathocratic na-
tion, similarly wide circles simultaneously increase their prac-
tical knowledge about the reality and behavioral methods of
that system. Should such a semi-colony thus achieve too much
independence or even decide to defect, too much of this knowl-
edge could then reach the consciousness of normal man’s coun-
tries. This could represent a serious defeat for pathocracy.
Ever-increasing control is thus necessary until full pathoc-
racy can be achieved. Those leaders whom the central authori-
ties consider to be effectively transitional can be eliminated
unless they indicate a sufficient degree of submission. Geopo-
litical conditions are generally decisive in this area. That ex-
plains why it is easier for such leaders to survive on an outlying
island than in countries bordering the empire. Should such
leaders manage to maintain a larger degree of autonomy by
of their geopolitical position if the conditions are amenable.
During such a phase of crisis of trust, circumspect policy on
the part of normal man’s countries could still tip the scales in
favor of a structure which may be revolutionary and leftist, but
not pathocratic. However, this is not the only missing consid-
eration; another primary one is the lack of objective knowledge
about the phenomenon, something which would make such
policy possible.
No full-fledged pathocracy can develop
was insufficiently loyal thereto. This is the counterpart of a
showdown with the true adherents of the ideology within the
genesis of the original pathocracy, which can then develop, due
both to the appropriately imposed leaders and to the activity of
this phenomenon’s autonomous ponerogenic mechanisms.
After the initial governmental period, brutal, bloody, and
psychologically naive, such a pathocracy thereupon begins its
transformation into its dissimulative form, which has already
been described in discussing the genesis of the phenomenon
and the force-imposed pathocracy.
POLITICAL PONEROLOGY
221
come: when a mighty network of the society of normal people
is formed.
The above lapidary description of an infectious imposition
of pathocracy indicates that this process repeats all the phases
of independent ponerogenesis
Underneath the rulership of its incompetent administrative
predecessors, we can even discern a period of hyperactivity on
the part of schizoidal individuals mesmerized by the vision of
their own rule based on contempt for human nature, especially
if they are numerous within a given country. They do not real-
ize that pathocracy will never make their dreams come true; it
will rather shunt them into the shadows, since individuals with
whom we are already familiar will become the leaders.
A pathocracy thus generated will be more strongly im-