Потаённые страницы истории западной философии

The article attempts to identify Aristotle’s original ideas regarding language and signs. Analysis shows that Aristotle does not classify words as signs. We can say that Aristotle understands «word» as the title of stories about a thing. It turns out that the word not only unites many stories under the guise of a common name, but also presupposes syllogisms from itself, from «logos». A word that has no other words (stories) inside it is not a word. Regarding to the sign, Aristotle’s position is also original: he excludes from the number of signs everything that can be excluded: images, words, signals, pointers, ciphers, signs. The concept of sign is defined by Aristotle either in relation to memory or in relation to inference. The connection between a word and a sign is that the word is marked with a «sign for memory» (name) and is capable of being a «sign for inference» (like the term of a syllogism). Aristotle takes the word beyond the limits of oral and written speech but brings it closer to figurativeness and visuality.

Aristotle’s treatise «Categories»: word and sign

Aristotle’s treatise «Categories» has a bad reputation in the history of philosophy: they either refuse to understand it or try to adapt it to one or another «ism». The article takes a different approach: there is a keyword in «Categories» that has been ignored for centuries. This is the word «said», which should not be taken literally as if someone said something. Categories refer to «what is said», but not by a person or even by a language. Things «speak» themselves; a person in his own language acts only as a translator from the «language of things» to the «language of people». Animals, accordingly, translate the «language of things» into their own «language of animals». In Aristotle’s philosophy, «metaphysics» comes from the understanding that a thing is always in a word, and a word is in a thing. This is not a confusion of words and things due to thoughtlessness, but a different understanding of «metaphysics», including questions of the philosophy of language.

Seneca’s transition from Plato to Aristotle: the problem of taste and conscience

In the history of philosophy, Seneca is known as a representative of the Stoics and «Academics», followers of Plato. But there is one case where Seneca not only differs in his opinion from the views of Plato, but sharply criticizes Plato. This is a question about the ratio between good and honor. «Good» in Plato’s hierarchy of ideas occupies the highest level: everything is from Good. Seneca, faced with the problem of Nero’s upbringing, concludes that without honor the idea of good ceases to be good. The concept of honor in the form of a «beautiful act» served as the basis in Aristotle’s ethics. As a result, Seneca, by relating the concepts of good (Plato) and honor (Aristotle), introduces a new concept into philosophy: «conscience». Conscience in Seneca’s concept as the unity of honor and good is unambiguous for all humanity but does not exist in every society. There is no conscience in a society when either there are no norms of behavior, or there are more than one. In this sense, conscience is a norm of behavior that is the same for all humanity – like the «beautiful act» from Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle is fully aware that the concept of «honor» is a class concept, but this does not exclude borrowing by other classes, even domestic servants. Honor arises only in one class but can be borrowed by all others. Seneca has the same «conscience». For Aristotle, «honor» and «beautiful deed» exist through each other, therefore, when moving to aesthetics, a connection arises between conscience and good taste. Good taste is as determined as conscience. Good taste goes back to the absoluteness of conscience, thereby acquiring an irrespective character.

Apology for Hegel’s dissertation «On the Orbits of the Planets»

Hegel’s dissertation «On the Orbits of the Planets» is usually regarded either as an unsuccessful attempt by a speculative philosopher to have his say in astronomy, or as insignificant preparatory materials for a future «philosophy of nature». However, Hegel’s dissertation is not at all about astronomy and not exactly about the philosophy of nature; it is about a possible «big physics» in the future, based on principles other than traditional European science. Under the pretext of criticizing Newton’s «force of universal gravitation», Hegel paves the way for the «philosophy of spirit», the immediate results of which were «Phenomenology of Spirit» and «Science of Logic».