"Comrades, we failed initially to achieve strategic and tactical surprise. Surprise is the most important variable factor in war. With it we would probably-almost certainly-have succeeded in two or three weeks."
"To achieve certain success now, what else will you need?"
"Comrade Defense Minister, I need the support of the people and the Party, and I need a little time."
"You evade the question!" Marshal Bukharin said.
"We were never allowed to use our chemical weapons in the initial assault. That could have been a decisive advantage-"
"The political cost of those weapons was deemed too great," the Foreign Minister said defensively.
"Could you make profitable use of them now?" the General Secretary asked.
"I think not. Those weapons should have been used from the first on equipment-storage depots. The depots are now mainly empty, and hitting them would have only a limited effect. Use of chemicals at the front is no longer a viable option. The newly arriving C formations lack the modem equipment necessary to operate efficiently in a chemical environment."
"Again I ask the question," the Defense Minister repeated. "What do you need to make victory certain?"
"To achieve a decisive breakthrough, we need to be able to blast a hole in NATO lines at least thirty kilometers wide and twenty kilometers in depth. To do that, I need ten full-strength divisions on line, ready to advance. I need several days to prepare that force."
"How about tactical nuclear weapons?" Alekseyev's face did not change. Are you mad, Comrade General Secretary?
"The risks are high." There's a prize understatement.
"And if we can prevent, politically, NATO retaliation?" Defense asked.
"I do not know how that is possible." And neither do you.
"But if we can make it possible?"
"Then it would increase our chances measurably." Alekseyev paused, inwardly chilled at what he saw in those faces. They want to use nuclear weapons at the front-and when NATO responds in kind and vaporizes my troops, then what? Will it stop with a single exchange or will more and more be used, the explosions advancing west and east? If I tell them they are crazy, they will find a general who will not "The problem is one of control, Comrades."
"Explain."
If he were to stay alive and prevent this... Alekseyev spoke carefully, mixing truth and lies and guesses. Dissimulation did not come easily to the General, but at least this was an issue he had discussed with his peers for over a decade. "Comrade General Secretary, nuclear weapons are, foremost, political weapons for both sides, controlled by political leaders. This limits their battlefield utility. A decision to use an atomic warhead in a tactical environment must be passed on by those leaders. By the time approval is granted, the tactical situation will almost certainly have changed, and the weapon is no longer useful. NATO never has seemed to grasp this. The weapons they have are mainly designed to be used by battlefield commanders, yet I have never thought myself that NATO's political leadership would lightly give use authority to those battlefield commanders. Because of this, the weapons they would more probably use against us are actually strategic weapons aimed at strategic targets, not the tactical weapons in the field."
"That is not what they say," Defense objected.
"You will note that when we made our breakthroughs at Alfeld and R?hle, nuclear weapons were not used on the bridgeheads even though some prewar NATO writings would seem to suggest they should have been. I conclude that there are more variable factors in the equation than were fully appreciated. We have learned ourselves that the reality of war can be different from the theory of war."
"So you support our decision to use tactical nuclear weapons?" the Foreign Minister asked.
No! The lie rolled off his lips. "If you are certain that you can prevent retaliation, of course I support it. I caution you, however, that my reading of NATO's response might be very different from what we might otherwise expect. I would expect retaliation to fall some hours later than we think, and against strategic rather than tactical targets. They are more likely to hit road and rail junctions, airfields, and supply facilities. These do not move. Our tanks do." Think on what I just said, Comrades. things will quickly go out of control. Make peace, you fools!
"So you think we could use tactical weapons with impunity if we simultaneously threaten strategic targets of our own?" the General Secretary asked hopefully.
"That is essentially the NATO pre-war doctrine. It overlooks the fact that the use of nuclear weapons over friendly territory is not something undertaken lightly. Comrades, I warn you that the prevention of a NATO response will not be an easy exercise."
"You worry about the battlefield, Comrade General," the Defense Minister suggested lightly. "We will worry about the political questions."