At Tula, December 3 turned out to be the most critical day; at most other sectors of the front, however, the Germans had been virtually stopped about a week earlier, and already preparations were in full progress for the Russian counter-offensive which was to start on the 6th.
Towards the middle of their second offensive against Moscow, the Germans were
beginning to suffer from the cold. A little over a week after Guderian had bitterly
complained that he couldn't move his tanks because of the mud and was hoping for an
early frost, which would make it easier to advance on Moscow, he started to complain equally bitterly about the frost for which he had longed. On November 6 he wrote:
It is miserable for the troops and a great pity that the enemy should thus gain time while our plans are postponed until the winter is more and more advanced. It all
makes me very sad... The unique chance of striking a single great blow is fading
more and more. How things will turn out, God only knows.
And then he said that, on November 7, "we suffered our first severe cases of frostbite".
By November 17 he sounded even more downcast:
We are only nearing our final objective step by step in this icy cold and with all the troops suffering from this appalling supply situation. The difficulties of supplying us by railroad are constantly increasing... Without fuel, our trucks can't move... Yet our troops are fighting with wonderful endurance despite all these handicaps... I am
thankful that our men are such good soldiers.It was all most distressing. As he later wrote:
The 1941 harvest had been a rich one throughout the country, and there was no
shortage of cattle. (But) as a result of our wretched rail communications only a
small amount of food could be sent to Germany from the area of the Second Panzer
Army.
[
Guderian, op. cit., pp. 246-9. Here is also to be found the much more dubious story about the wonderfully good care the Germans were taking to supply the Russian civilians at Orel and elsewhere with food! As we shall later see, Orel suffered from an appalling famine in the winter of 1941-2 under Guderian's tender care. See p. 690.]On November 17, we learned that Siberian troops had appeared ... and that more
were arriving by rail at Riazan and Kolomna. The 112th Infantry Division made
contact with these new Siberian troops. Since enemy tanks were attacking
simultaneously... the weakened troops could not manage this fresh enemy. Before
judging their performance it should be borne in mind that each regiment had
already lost some 500 men from frostbite, that, as a result of the cold, the machine-guns were no longer able to fire and that our 37-mm. antitank gun had proved
ineffective against the Russian T-34 tanks. The result of all this was a panic... This was the first time that such a thing had occurred during the Russian campaign...
The battle-worthiness of our infantry was at an end...
For all that, Guderian continued to attack Tula, and also records the fact that his troops did, at one moment, cut the Tula-Moscow highway as well as the Tula-Moscow railway;
but it is clear from his story that something went wrong—though he does not say
anything except that "the strength of the troops was exhausted, as was their supply of fuel."