Russia at war 1941-1945

middle of July? And what hope was there of feeding this enormous population in case

Leningrad was encircled?

It was clear, even during the war, that there had been some very serious miscalculations somewhere; but the factual material published in the last few years shows that this tragic situation was created by a whole series of specific mistakes. There had been lack of foresight on the part of the authorities who, primarily concerned with slowing down the German advance, had given almost no thought at all to the question of food supplies

inside the city; also, for several crucial weeks, when the Germans seemed to have been stopped on the Luga Line, there had been an excess of optimistic propaganda; this was responsible for much wishful thinking among the people of Leningrad, who simply did

not visualise the city being either occupied or blockaded.

This lack of foresight is illustrated by a number of striking facts. Thus, during the German blitzkrieg advance through the Baltic Republics and right into the Leningrad province in June and July, many thousands of tons of grain were evacuated by rail from areas about to be overrun by the Germans, but to the east, and not to Leningrad. At the same time, the evacuation of industrial plants from Leningrad continued to be delayed.

The very slow progress of the evacuation in July and August was due to wishful thinking: people did not believe that the Germans would come anywhere near the city. It is true that, owing to the danger of air-raids, children began to be evacuated in June and early July, but oddly enough to places like Gatchina and Luga, on the Germans' direct road to Leningrad. Soon afterwards they had to be hurriedly brought back to Leningrad, and

some—but not all—were then evacuated to the east, where they remained in perfect

safety until the end of the war.

Altogether the evacuation of Leningrad throughout July and August was very slow

indeed. Only 40,000 people—mostly workers of plants earmarked for evacuation, and

their families—left for the east, besides about 150,000 refugees from the Baltic

Republics, Pskov, etc.

Some local authorities regarded a refusal to be evacuated as a manifestation of patriotism, and actually encouraged such attitudes. One could often hear such officials say: "Our population is ready to dig trenches right in the front line, but it doesn't want to leave Leningrad." This was typical of Leningrad's mood, but it overlooked the fact that there were many people—children, old people and invalids, who were of no use to the defence of the city, and were merely a drain on the city's scant food reserves.

[Pavlov, op. cit., pp. 58-59.]

Moreover, in July and August, most Leningraders did not know exactly where the

Germans were, and since during those two months, the city was not being bombed, they adopted an optimistically complacent attitude.

The situation called for strong administrative evacuation measures, but the authorities hesitated to apply them. As a result there were caught in the blockade 2,544,000 civilians (including 400,000 children) in Leningrad proper, and 343,000 people in the suburbs and other localities inside the ring of the blockade—a total of nearly three millions.

[ Pavlov, op. cit., p. 60.]

To these "mouths to be fed" should, of course, be added the troops who were later to constitute the "Leningrad Front" proper. The mass-evacuation of civilians did not start until January 1942, across the Ice Road of Lake Ladoga. By this time, hundreds of

thousands of civilians had already died of hunger.

The whole extent of the disaster of Leningrad cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of the food reserves available at the beginning of the blockade, of the

rationing measures taken, and of the meagre supplies brought from outside against

appalling difficulties.

On September 6, two days before the land blockade was finally complete, Popkov, head of the Leningrad Soviet, cabled to the State Defence Committee in Moscow, saying that there was very little food left in the city and urging that as much as possible be sent by rail immediately.

[On that day Popkov still hoped that Mga would be recaptured by the Russians. (Ibid., p.

60.)]

But the railways had already been cut, and two days later, all other land communications as well. On September 12 it was established that, on the basis of the rationing system that had been introduced on July 18 in Moscow, Leningrad and other cities, the stocks

available in Leningrad for both troops and civilians only amounted to:

Grain and flour ............... 35 days' supply

Cereals and macaroni ......... 30 days' supply

Meat, including live cattle ... 33 days' supply

Fats .............................. 45 days' supply

Sugar and confectionery ...... 60 days' supply