This slightly eased the fuel situation in Leningrad, without, however, solving it. By the end of October, the city's electric-power supply was only a small fraction of what it had been. The use of electric light was prohibited everywhere, except at the General Staff, the Smolny [The headquarters of the Leningrad Defence Council under Zhdanov, and of the
City Soviet and other central organisations. Originally a famous school for young
gentlewomen, it had been the headquarters of Lenin and the Bolsheviks during the 1917
Revolution.], Party offices, civil defence stations, and certain other offices; but ordinary houses, as well as most offices had to do without light throughout the long winter nights.
Central heating was abandoned in flats, offices and houses, and in factories central heating was replaced by small wood stoves. Owing to the lack of electricity, most
factories had to close down, or use the most primitive methods for making the machines turn at all—such as bicycle pedals. Tram-cars were sharply reduced in number in
October, and in November they stopped running altogether. No food, no light, no heat, and, on top of it all, German air-raids and constant shelling—such was the life of
Leningrad in the winter of 1941-2.
Chapter IV THE LADOGA LIFELINE
With Leningrad firmly encircled by the Germans by the beginning of September,
desperate remedies had to be devised for bringing supplies to the city. It could no longer be assumed that the blockade on land would be broken within a short time. Therefore, on September 9, the Leningrad War Council decided to build a harbour in the small bay of Osinovets, on the west bank of Lake Ladoga near the end of a suburban railway line,
some thirty-five miles north-east of Leningrad. Through it some capital equipment could, it was reckoned, be evacuated from Leningrad, and food and other supplies brought in.
The port was intended to handle twelve vessels a day by the end of September. The
Ladoga naval flotilla, supplied with some anti-aircraft guns, was supposed to protect the new port.
Needless to say, with the Germans only some twenty-five miles south of Osinovets, their planes not only kept a constant watch on the new harbour, but also on the primitive little harbour of Novaya Ladoga on the south side of the lake through which the supplies went, as well as on any cargoes crossing the lake between the two points. Many tugs and barges were sunk during the first weeks of the "Ladoga Lifeline", including several with women and children evacuees from Leningrad.
*
This flimsy lifeline proved inevitably disappointing. During the first month in which the new improvised harbour of Osinovets was open, only 9,800 tons of food were brought
from beyond Lake Ladoga. This represented an eight-days' food supply for Leningrad,
which was thus reduced to living on its reserves during the remaining twenty-two days.
This was all the more disastrous as, by November, the half-frozen lake would be unusable for either vessels or road transport. Some urgent measures were therefore taken, and, between October 14 and 20, 5,000 tons of food were brought from Novaya Ladoga to
Osinovets; but this was still very little. Between October 20 and the beginning of
November, 12,000 tons of flour and 1,000 tons of meat were rushed from inside Russia to Lake Ladoga, and, despite constant German air attacks, and autumn gales that were now sweeping the lake, most of this food was safely delivered in Leningrad. Apart from food, a considerable quantity of munitions was also transported.
But by November 15, Lake Ladoga ceased to be navigable. Summing up the results of
this stage of the Ladoga lifeline, Pavlov writes:
The water lifeline in the autumn of 1941 was a great help to the besieged city.
Between September 12 and the end of navigation on November 15, 24,000 tons of
flour and cereals, 1,131 tons of meat and dairy produce were delivered, besides
considerable quantities of munitions and fuel. The 25,000 tons of food represented only a fraction of what was required, yet this enabled Leningrad to hold out an