Russia at war 1941-1945

Having elaborated at some length on the perplexities of pact-making for the protection of the many frontiers so precariously maintained between the Baltic and the Black Sea and between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, Molotov introduced another motif into his discourse which was like an echo of Stalin's speech of March 10.

Such are our talks with Britain and France. That does not mean that we intend to

break off business relations with countries like Germany and Italy. At the beginning of 1938 Germany offered us a new credit of 200 million marks; but since no

agreement followed, the question of this credit was dropped. However, at the end of 1938 the German Government again raised the question of economic talks, and of

the 200 million marks credit. The Germans were ready to make certain concessions, and their Foreign Trade Ministry said that Herr Schnurre would come to Moscow.

But instead it. was decided that Ambassador Schulenburg would conduct the talks.

Since there were some disagreements, the talks broke down. But now there are signs that the talks may be resumed. We also signed recently a profitable trade agreement with Italy...

In conclusion, Molotov said that relations with Poland had "improved"; that relations with Turkey were "good", and that he had recently warned the Japanese Ambassador that the Soviet Union would defend both her own frontiers and those of the Mongolian

People's Republic against any Japanese-Manchurian aggression.

The Soviet Union is not what it was, say in 1921, though even some of our

neighbours seem to have forgotten it. Nor is the Soviet Union what it was ten, or even five years ago; its strength is far greater. In spite of delays and hesitations, some democracies are becoming conscious of this simple truth; yet in any front of the peaceful powers resisting aggression the Soviet Union cannot but hold a place inthe front rank.

What Molotov had said about trade talks with Germany did not, on the face of it, amount to much; it might have been meant as a mild warning to the West, where some of

Chamberlain's close associates still considered "trade talks" with Germany to be their best hope of resuming an appeasement policy. Molotov was, of course, aware of the long-standing tug-of-war going on in Britain, below and above the surface, inside and outside the Tory Party, between the advocates and the opponents of a pact with the Soviet Union.

Until further notice the Soviet press maintained a fairly consistent anti-Nazi line, playing the "Western" card. On June 9 Tass reported from London Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons on the Franco-British-Soviet talks; there was, Chamberlain had said, a common point of view about the main features of the intended agreement, and to speed up the talks H.M. Government had decided to send to Moscow a representative of the

Foreign Office. This was the beginning of the "Strang Mission". Special prominence was given to influential utterances in Britain in favour of a pact with the Soviet Union, notably to Churchill's article in the Daily Telegraph on June 9. Churchill even went so far as to advocate a joint guarantee to the Baltic States and Finland, and declared that such a pact was as much in the interests of the Soviet Union as it was in the interests of France and Britain. But, said Churchill, there was no time to lose.

At the same time, the Soviet papers continued to carry numerous stories about "German looting in Czechoslovakia" (Hubert Ripka in the Spectator quoted by Pravda on June 9),

"Austria under the heel of the Nazi invaders" ( Pravda June 16), "Executions in Spain"