Russia at war 1941-1945

{Pravda June 15), and so on. Alongside with this went accounts about growing German pressure on Poland, and reports of some of the more violent speeches by Nazi leaders—

such as Goebbels's attack on England in his Danzig speech at the end of June, with its

"hands off Eastern Europe! " slogan. Altogether the growing violence over Danzig was being fully reported, and in a tone very far from friendly to the Germans. These, the Soviet press kept on suggesting, were out for trouble:

Danzig is teeming with German military trucks that have come from Königsberg...

Danzig is being invaded by hordes of "tourists" and other highly suspect elements...

The German papers are continuing to carry screaming headlines about Poland's

"aggressiveness". The Völkischer Beobachter is screaming that the Poles want to invade East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia and other German territories.

[ Pravda, July 2, 1939.]

Although, whenever there was any vitally important business to discuss with Hitler, the British Government would send him Eden, Simon, Halifax—or Chamberlain in person,

the British Prime Minister seemed to think that an experienced Foreign Office official, like Mr Strang, was more than good enough for Moscow. This choice had, indeed, been

severely criticised by the Opposition press and Opposition speakers, who had argued that at least somebody of Halifax's or Eden's stature should be sent there. But, in

Chamberlain's view Halifax had other things to do, while Eden was much too friendly to the Russians—he had already gone to Moscow in 1935— and Mr Strang would be better

suited to what Chamberlain wanted to be no more than an exploratory mission—or

merely a sop to the Opposition. He was determined to turn a deaf ear to all the warnings, coming from Churchill and others, that the time factor was of the utmost importance. It was indeed not surprising that the Strang appointment should have aroused little

enthusiasm in Moscow.

There is a remarkable passage in Maisky's reminiscences about the visit he paid Halifax on June 12, the day of Strang's departure for Moscow:

To get the three-power pact concluded with the utmost speed—for that was our

basic object—and to discover our British partners' real intentions, the Soviet

Government decided to invite Lord Halifax to Moscow... On June 12 I was

instructed to call on Halifax in a personal capacity, and to urge him in a friendly but pressing way to go to Moscow without delay to complete the negotiations and to sign the pact.

[I. Maisky, Kto pomogal Hitlern? (Who Helped Hitler?), Moscow, 1962. English translation, London, 1964.]

After pointing out to Halifax the extreme urgency of the problem, Maisky said, "'If you can go to Moscow right away, Lord Halifax, I shall ask my Government to send you an

official invitation.' A hard and mysterious look came over Halifax's face. He looked at the ceiling, then rubbed the bridge of his nose, and then solemnly declared: 'I shall bear it in mind.' I realised of course that he could not decide on this visit to Moscow without referring the matter to the Cabinet... After a week, there was still no reply."

[In conclusion, Maisky writes that he had an important postscript to make to this account of his meeting with Halifax on June 12. In the Documents of British Foreign Policy

published later by the British Government, there was Halifax's own account of this

meeting. According to this, Maisky had suggested that Halifax should go to Moscow

"when things had calmed down", to which Halifax had replied that nothing would please him better, but that at the present moment it would be impossible for him to leave

London.

Maisky then proceeds to demonstrate that, in Halifax's account of the same meeting, the Foreign Secretary had told "two untruths", both showing that, like Chamberlain, he was less than lukewarm about coming to a quick agreement with Moscow. This lack of

enthusiasm, on both Halifax's and Chamberlain's part, is, of course, fully borne out by Churchill in what he said at the time and wrote later.