Russia at war 1941-1945

Antonescu had argued months before with Hitler in favour of evacuating these Rumanian troops; the attempt to hold the peninsula struck him as totally unrealistic. But Hitler would not hear of it. Many of the Rumanian troops, realising no doubt that Sebastopol—

to which all the German troops were now rapidly converging—would be a death-trap,

and that they would, in any case, be the last to be evacuated, hastened to surrender to the Russians in the northern Crimea, at Simferopol, and along the coast.

By April 18, the bulk of the German forces had rapidly retreated to Sebastopol which Hitler now declared to be "Festung Sewastopol". This would have to be held indefinitely by some 50,000 men; the others could be evacuated; the Russians had held Sebastopol for 250 days in 1941-2, and had created a "Sebastopol Legend"; the Germans must now do at least as well.

[According to German sources Hitler thought it essential to hold Sebastopol at least until he had repelled the expected Normandy landing six or eight weeks later.]

On April 18 the front ran in a semi-circle east of Sebastopol, and was twenty-five miles in length.

In their hurried retreat to Sebastopol, the German troops nevertheless caused considerable destruction. They destroyed the whole sea-front at Yalta, but had no time to destroy the rest of the town (including the Chekhov Museum, where the writer had lived) or the

former palaces at Alupka, one of which had been presented to Manstein "the conqueror of the Crimea" by "the grateful German nation" back in 1942. It was in these palaces that the Yalta Conference was to meet less than a year later.

It was later argued on the Russian side that if only the Red Army had begun to storm Sebastopol immediately after April 18, and had not waited till May 5, very few of the German troops could have got away at all; but the storming of Sebastopol required a high concentration of troops, guns and tanks, a thorough organisation of airfields, etc., and this needed some time. According to Tolbukhin, no successful all-out attack was possible

without about a fortnight's preparation.

It will remain one of the puzzles of the war why, in 1941-2, despite overwhelming

German and Rumanian superiority in tanks and aircraft, and a substantial superiority in men, Sebastopol succeeded in holding out for 250 days and why, in 1944, the Russians captured it within four days. German authors now explain it simply by the great Russian superiority in effectives, aircraft and all other equipment. But did not the Germans and Rumanians enjoy much the same kind of superiority in 1941-2? Was there not something lacking in German morale by April 1944—at least in a remote place like the Crimea? For, as we know, the Germans could still put up suicidal resistance once on German soil.

A moot question is how many Germans were actually evacuated from the Crimea

between April 18 and May 13. According to a Russian general I saw at Sebastopol at the time, only 30,000 got away; according to German war prisoners taken, at least twice as many. Post-war German accounts say that 150,000 got away, but that "at least 60,000

Germans" were "lost" in the Crimea; as well as enormous masses of equipment, while sixty ships were sunk. The Russians put the enemy losses in the Crimea much higher—

50,000 (nearly all Germans) killed and 61,000 taken prisoner (30,000 of them at

Chersonese)—a total loss of 111,000; but these (especially the prisoners) obviously

included a great number of Rumanians. German authors today are surprised that the

Russian Black Sea fleet allowed so many ships to get away; the Russian answer to this is that the sea between Sebastopol and Rumania was heavily mined, but that many German

ships, with 40,000 men on board, were sunk all the same, mostly by aircraft between May 3 and 13.

Anyway, whether the Germans lost (as they now admit) at least 60,000 men or (as the

Russians claim) nearer 100,000 men, the whole Crimean operation, and Hitler's futile attempt to stage a German version of the "Heroic Defence of Sebastopol" is now admitted to have been one of the Führer's prime blunders. German histories today say that the German commander of the 17th Army, Colonel-General Jaenicke, was made a scapegoat

by the Führer. In fact he informed Hitler that he could not hold Sebastopol and was

relieved of his command on May 3, and was replaced by General Allme-dinger. Whether, at heart, the latter had any more hope than Jaenicke is hard to say; but he was apparently a more wholehearted Nazi. The big Russian onslaught began two days after his

appointment.

In his farewell message, which the Russians captured at the time, Jaenicke wrote:

"The Führer has ordered me to take up new functions. This means a bitter good-bye to my Army. With deep emotion I shall remember your exemplary courage. The