existed, there would always be a menace." And again he started on the Rhine frontier. It was essential for France and Russia to join forces. Britain, which was "always late", could rank only as a "second-stage" ally, and the United States as a "third-stage" ally.
Neither could be depended upon in the great moment of danger, and under a Tripartite Pact all immediate action would inevitably be slowed down by the British.
Stalin agreed that a straight Franco-Soviet Pact would make France more independent in relation to "other countries", but since it would be difficult for Russia and France alone to win the war, he still preferred a Tripartite Pact.
De Gaulle then said that the Tripartite Pact was "un-French"; it would, in present circumstances, stress France's inferiority
Germany, and, moreover, she was expecting all kinds of difficulties with the British both in the Middle East and the Far East.
Stalin remarked that the Tripartite Pact was Churchill's idea, and that he [Stalin] and his colleagues had agreed to the British proposal. True, Churchill had not vetoed the Franco-Soviet Pact, but, all the same, he preferred the Tripartite Pact.
If we shelve this (Stalin continued), Churchill will be offended. However, since the French are so anxious to have a straight Franco-Soviet Pact, let me suggest this: if the French want us to render them a service, then let them render us one. Poland is an element in our security. Let the French accept in Paris a representative of the
Polish Committee of National Liberation, and we shall sign the Franco-Soviet Pact.Churchill will be offended, but it can't be helped.
"You have probably offended Churchill before," de Gaulle said.
"I have sometimes offended Churchill," Stalin replied, "and Churchill has sometimes offended me. Some day our correspondence will be published, and you will see what kind of messages we have sometimes exchanged."
There seems, at this point, to have been an embarrassed silence and then Stalin suddenly asked de Gaulle when he intended to return to France. De Gaulle said he was hoping to leave in two days.
After a somewhat irrelevant digression on the aircraft factory the French guests had visited, de Gaulle remarked that he much regretted that there could be no Franco-Soviet Pact, and it would now be necessary to start discussing a Tripartite Pact. He appreciated Stalin's policy on Poland, but it was not at all clear what the Lublin Committee
represented.
The meeting broke up in a chilly atmosphere.
Later that day Bidault called on Molotov and said there had perhaps been some
"misunderstanding" about the Lublin Committee. Anyway, de Gaulle intended to see the member of this Committee on the following day. Molotov said he hoped this meeting
would make a great difference, and meantime he and Bidault could work on the draft of
De Gaulle was no more impressed by Bierut, Osöbka-Morawski and Rola-Zymierski than
Eden and Churchill had been, and agreed, in the end, before leaving Moscow, to no more than sending an "unofficial" French representative to Lublin, and "quite independently"
of the Franco-Soviet Pact.
Such was the horse-trading that went on for over a week between Stalin and de Gaulle—
each, in his own way, trying to pull a fast one on Britain and the United States.
The atmosphere surrounding this French visit to Moscow was not devoid of comedy. One day, de Gaulle and Bidault were taken for a ride on the Metro, where nobody took any notice of them and where they were pushed about and had their feet trodden on
mercilessly. Bidault seemed particularly outraged when he told me about it. In their negotiations, he said, the Russians were pretty rough:
["There's a lack of graciousness, a lack of courtesy. A brutal, inhuman régime... " "Are these people mute? Have they any feelings at all?"]
One assured him that they had, though not necessarily for official French visitors, of whom they knew little or nothing. And the people on top, Bidault fumed, were mean and