and pack them off to Germany. But how do you stand for airmen?
Having got over this phase of the talk, in which he had to act the poor relation (there is no mention of these remarks in his
régime, but not the Rhineland proper.
Stalin asked how Britain and America looked upon this, to which de Gaulle replied that these had already let France down in 1918 by insisting on a temporary arrangement,
which just didn't work. As a result, France was again invaded. Perhaps Britain and
America had learned their lesson, but he couldn't be sure.
something quite different. We must find out what Britain and America think about
it.
De Gaulle then went on with his sharp criticism of Britain and America. They were
neither geographically nor historically on the Rhine, and the French and Russians had had to pay a heavy price for this. Even though they were fighting there now, they would not be on the Rhine forever, while France and Russia would always remain where they were.
The full-scale intervention of Britain and America always took place in peculiar
conditions—much too late; as a result, France was nearly destroyed in 1940.
Stalin was not convinced. The strength of Russia and France alone were insufficient to keep Germany in order. The experience of the two world wars had demonstrated this.
Frontiers in themselves were not of decisive importance; what mattered was a good and well-commanded army. It was no use relying on the Maginot Line, or Hitler's
And when de Gaulle still persisted, Stalin said:
Please understand me. We simply cannot settle this question of France's eastern
frontier without having talked about it to the British and the Americans. This and many other problems must be decided jointly.
Obviously not at all satisfied with this, de Gaulle tried to approach the question from a different angle by bringing up Germany's eastern frontier.
should be returned to Poland, while the Sudeten country should be given back to
Czechoslovakia.
But he did not rise to the bait.