Russia at war 1941-1945

he also argued against "stuffing the Polish goose so full of German food that it would get indigestion", and particularly against the Western (and not the Eastern) Neisse being taken as part of the western frontier of Poland. Against this, Molotov argued in favour of giving Poland back her ancient frontiers in East Prussia and on the Oder. "How long ago were these lands Polish?" Roosevelt asked. "Very long ago," said Molotov. Roosevelt merely made a wisecrack in reply: "This might lead the British to ask for a return of the United States to Great Britain."

But the Russians felt, in their own way, even more strongly about Poland than Churchill did. In reply to one of Churchill's harangues about Poland having to remain "captain of her soul", Stalin remarked: "To Britain, Poland is a question of honour; to the Soviet Union it is a question of both honour and security," and, time and again, he returned to the question of the Armija Krajowa constituting a threat to the Red Army in Poland.

The record of Yalta shows that, while agreeing to give the Western Allies something of a face-saver in the shape of the Harriman-Molotov-Clark Kerr committee, which would

help to "reorganise" the Polish Government, and thus "prepare" a free Polish election, Stalin made no secret whatsoever of what he considered to be Russia's fundamental

interests in Poland. A "free and unfettered" Polish election—even though he reluctantly subscribed to it—was not one of them.

The same, broadly speaking, applied to other countries in eastern Europe, notably

Rumania and Bulgaria. It is perhaps significant that, according to Stettinius, Stalin should have remarked several times at Yalta that he did not give a hang about Greece, and had every confidence in British policy there. This meant that there was, in fact, a tacit agreement about "spheres of influence", roughly on the lines of those already agreed upon in Moscow in October 1944,

[See pp. 912-3. This is hotly denied in the post-war Soviet History, which says, in particular, that Churchill's story about the "50-50" agreement on Yugoslavia is "pure fiction". (IVOVSS, V. p. 134.)]

except that, in the case of Poland, Churchill (and, to a lesser extent, Roosevelt) continued to have serious qualms. But neither could overlook the fact that Poland was in the rear of the Red Army. It is significant that when, soon after Yalta, the Russians ordered King Michael of Rumania to dismiss General Radescu and replace him by the pro-Soviet Petru Groza, Roosevelt thought it inappropriate to protest because the Red Army's

communication and supply lines ran through Rumania. The same, in a sense, was also

true of Poland.

[Some ten days after Yalta, at the Red Army Day reception that Molotov gave in Moscow on February 23, Vyshinsky, trying to sound rather drunk (which he wasn't) proposed a toast to some of the big shots of the Soviet armaments industries present: " I drink to you," he said, "who are the best and most indispensable auxiliaries of us diplomats.

Without you, we should be completely helpless." And he then announced that he was going to leave for Bucharest the next morning, "just to show them where they got off." It was not quite clear who "they" were, but it was soon learned that he had had a "very serious" talk with King Michael; that he had banged the royal desk with his fist and that, as a result, the pro-Western General Radescu had been replaced at the head of the

Rumanian Government by Mr Peter Groza. Radescu took refuge in the British Legation.]

The Yalta Conference devoted less time than one might have expected to the problem of Germany. "Closer co-ordination of the three Allies than ever before" was decided upon.

The published Report on the Conference said that Nazi Germany was doomed, and that

the German people "will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance." The terms of the unconditional surrender were not published:

These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany... The forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany... [There will be]

a central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the Three

Powers with headquarters in Berlin.

[Berlin, not part of the Soviet zone, was to be a distinct zone divided in four.]

France, the Report continued, would be invited to take over a zone of occupation and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission, if she so desired.