Russia at war 1941-1945

There is every reason to believe that, at Yalta, Stalin was still hoping that such a loan might materiaUse; it would have meant the relatively "easy" way of reconstruction for the Russian people, instead of the "hard" way that Stalin had to choose for them despite certain "ideological" objections to the former solution.

It may be possible to read a hint at such a loan into Stalin's toast to Roosevelt at one of the Yalta banquets when he said that the President had been "the chief forger of the instruments which had led to the mobilisation of the world against Hitler." Lend-lease, he said, was "one of the President's most remarkable and vital achievements" which pointed to an exceptionally broad conception of America's national interests.

Although he also paid some glowing compliments to Churchill at the same banquet—"the bravest governmental figure in the world" —all observers are agreed that he was much more anxious to be friendly to Roosevelt than to Churchill. Even so, he said he was sure that Churchill would continue to be at the head of the British Government, and that there would be no Labour victory in the next election. And he seemed to prefer it that way.

This, he suggested, was all the more desirable because—

The difficult task will come after the war, when diverse interests will tend to divide the Allies. I am confident, however, that the present alliance will meet that test and that the peace-time relations of the three Great Powers will be as strong as they were in war-time.

[ Stettinius, op. cit., p. 198.]

American writers have made much of Stalin's "betrayal" of Yalta so soon after the conference. Some have attributed it—not at all plausibly—to the criticisms and

opposition with which Stalin met from the "revolutionary doctrinaires" in the Politburo.

Much more credible are some of the other explanations offered for the "change" in Soviet policy after Yalta. It is probable that Stalin took note of Roosevelt's remark that the United States were unlikely to keep any troops in Europe for more than two years.

Secondly, he seems to have been impressed, soon after Yalta, by the great hostility that the Russians met in Poland, which led to his determination not to take any serious

chances, either there or in any of the other east-European countries.

The growing American opposition in March and April, to the idea of a big post-war loan to Russia was also of some importance, in increasing East-West tension. Roosevelt's

death caused genuine alarm in Russia—

[It made a very deep impression. All Soviet papers appeared with wide black borders on their front pages, and, by a curious instinct, people felt that this was a major tragedy for Russia which had lost "a real friend".]

—an alarm which soon proved justified, especially when President Truman made his

début in his Russian policy by stopping Lend-Lease for Russia immediately after VE-Day

—while Russia was still committed to entering the war against Japan, on America's side.

As we know from Harry Hopkin's account of his visit to Moscow soon afterwards, Stalin was deeply annoyed and offended by what Stettinius called this "untimely and incredible"

step.

Indeed, Yalta, this great manifestation of three-power unity of purpose with victory over Nazi Germany in sight, proved, perhaps inevitably, a watershed in inter-allied relations.

Conflicting interests and contrasting ideas that in normal circumstances would have been almost incompatible, had been shelved, while the gigantic struggle was in progress. But now when it came to preparing for peace the working compromises that had been reached proved only too fragile. As we have seen, it was difficult enough to reach these

compromises; now they were to be put to the test of being applied in practice and

interpreted in detail. Thus it became increasingly difficult to conceal those vital

differences of self-interest and outlook between the wartime coalition partners.

Another psychological factor contributed to the tension between Soviet Russia and the Allies towards the very end of the war in Europe. The approach of victory produced in Russia not only waves of relief, hope and indeed, elation, but even extraordinary

outbursts of national pride almost bordering on arrogance. There was, not least in the Red Army, a tendency to resent the presence of the Western Allies in Germany and especially in Berlin—in the capture of which so many thousands of Russians were to die in the last days of the war.