Molotov, Zhdanov and Vassilevsky on the Russian side, and Ryti, Paasikivi and General Waiden on the Finnish side. The terms were harder than those originally proposed by the Russians—let alone those originally "agreed to" by Kuusinen. Now the whole Karelian Isthmus, including Viborg and numerous islands, a part of Rybachi Peninsula on the
Arctic, west of Murmansk, and the country north of Lake Ladoga were annexed by the
Soviet Union; moreover, she received a thirty-year lease on Hangö for a naval base.
Nothing was said any more about the "Terijoki Government"; it might never have existed. All that it had achieved in effect was to unify the Finnish people (many of whom had thought the original Russian proposals quite reasonable), and to cause much
unnecessary resentment in Finland. Now this resentment was further increased by the loss of Viborg.
Since, by March 5, the Red Army could easily have occupied Helsinki and other parts of Finland, the Finns may be said to have been let off lightly; nevertheless, without the loss of Viborg, it is just conceivable that the Finns might have been less eager to attack the Soviet Union in 1941. In itself, Viborg was of very little strategic value, but its loss was keenly felt in Finland, where the many thousands of "Viborg refugees" added greatly to anti-Russian feeling. During the War, many Russians agreed (on the quiet) that the
annexation of Viborg had been a serious mistake.
As distinct from Britain and France, Germany had, in the official Russian view, remained commendably neutral during the Soviet-Finnish war. Even so, the thought must have
crossed the Russian leaders' minds that Germany might yet take advantage of Finnish
grievances and longing for revenge. On the face of it, it is true, the Russians had attained their objective, which was to render Leningrad "invulnerable". This, as it turned out, short-lived advantage was outweighed by the fact that the performance of the Red Army in the Finnish War was far from good. There was a danger that the Germans might draw certain conclusions from this.
That the Soviet General Staff was not satisfied with the Red Army's record in Finland may be seen from the far-reaching measures that began to be taken soon afterwards to reorganise the Army. 1940 was to become, in General Zhukov's words, the "year of the great transformation" in the Red Army.
For all that relations with Germany had remained highly satisfactory on the surface
throughout the duration of the Soviet-Finnish War. All the abuse in the Soviet press was reserved for the Western democracies which, it was now claimed, were more anxious
than ever to "generalise the war" and to drag the neutrals into it. As early as January 17,
On February 11, with the Soviet-Finnish war still in full swing, a new Soviet-German economic agreement was signed. This, said
welcomed... The new economic agreement had been welcomed by the
[
The volume and exact nature of these exchanges was not stated. Three days later
announcing that there was "more to come". As
[
There was a clear suggestion here that an attack in the West was now in the offing.
Molotov waited till the end of March before making a statement to the Supreme Soviet on the termination of the Finnish War and on the international situation generally. This speech was, at least outwardly, the most violently anti-British and anti-French ever made.
He was no longer regretting the breakdown in the Anglo-French-Soviet talks during the previous year; on the contrary, he now said that "the Soviet Union had been determined not to become a tool in the hands of the Anglo-French imperialists in their anti-German struggle for world hegemony".