Russia at war 1941-1945

1941, the situation had "radically changed"; Germany had attacked the USSR and Japan had helped Germany. Moreover, Japan was fighting a war against Britain and the United States, which were Allies of the Soviet Union. "In virtue of Article 3 ... allowing the right to denounce the Pact one year before its expiry, the Soviet Union hereby does so, as from April 13, 1945."

[ Juridically, the Five-Year Neutrality Pact was valid till April 13, 1946, despite this repudiation, and Russia's attack on Japan in August 1945 was in fact a violation of the Pact.]

On May 15, 1945 the Japanese Government annulled its alliance with the now non-

existent German government and other Fascist governments. The Soviet Government

considered this as a preliminary to a new series of peace-feelers the Japanese were about to put out; but there is nothing to show that they intended to respond favourably to them.

While, at the end of May, Harry Hopkins found the Russians extremely sticky on

questions like Poland, he found them perfectly co-operative as regards Japan. He cabled to Washington on May 28 saying that, according to Stalin, the Soviet Army would be

"properly deployed in the Manchurian positions by August 8"; that Stalin repeated the Yalta statement that the Russian people "must have good reason for going to war", and that this depended on the willingness of the Chinese to agree to the Yalta proposals; he therefore asked that T. V. Soong come to Moscow "not later than July 1 ", and urged that the USA (as Roosevelt had promised) take up the matter with Chiang Kai-shek.

Stalin's views on China, as reported by Hopkins, are particularly interesting, in the light of what happened later:

He [Stalin] categorically stated that he would do everything to promote the

unification of China under Chiang Kai-shek. His leadership would continue after

the war, because no one else was strong enough. He specifically stated that no

communist leader was strong enough to unify China. In spite of his reservations

about Chiang Kai-shek, he proposed to back him.

[Sherwood, op. cit., p. 892. None of this is reported in the present-day Soviet History which treats the Chinese Communists as the only force in China at the time not defeatist in its attitude to Japan.]

In another message to Washington Hopkins stated that Stalin was all in favour of the Open Door for the USA in China, since she alone was capable of giving large financial aid to that country, Russia having her own reconstruction to take care of. Stalin also intimated that the Soviet Union wanted an occupation zone in Japan.

The full story of the events that led to the capitulation of Japan is one of the most intricate in the whole of World War II. It is clear that, at Yalta, both Roosevelt and Churchill were still extremely anxious that Russia should join in the war against Japan as quickly as possible. The position becomes much less clear after Truman became President. Judging from the Hopkins' mission to Moscow in May, Truman still wanted Russia in the war—

which was one of the chief reasons why the new President also wanted to meet Stalin at Potsdam. The Russians now argue, however, that even before he had the atom bomb,

Truman was desperately anxious to get Japan— or at least "the Japanese armed forces"—

to surrender unconditionally before Russia entered the war. They may have suspected this at the time, on the strength of the American broadcasts to that effect, which began as early as May 8 [Much is made of these in the Soviet History. (IVOVSS, vol. V, p. 536)], but consoled themselves with the thought that Japan could not be defeated—at least not within a short time—without the Russians smashing the Kwantung Army in Manchuria.

They had understood from Roosevelt at Yalta that, without Russian participation, the war against Japan would have to go on till 1947, and would cost the Americans and British at least another million men.

As early as February-March, the Japanese sought Russian mediation in their desire to end the war with the USA and Britain. The Soviet History enumerates several such peace-feelers:

First of all, two "private" persons approached the Russians on behalf of the Japanese Government—Mr Mijakawa, the Japanese Consul-General in Harbin and

Mr Tanakamaru, a fishing magnate.

On March 4, the same Tanakamaru called on Mr J. Malik, the Soviet Ambassador