Russia at war 1941-1945

in Tokyo, saying that neither Japan nor the United States could start speaking of peace. A "divine outside force" was necessary to bring about a peace settlement, and the Soviet Union could play that rôle.

After the formation of the Suzuki Government, these peace-feelers became even

more explicit. Foreign Minister Togo asked Mr Malik on April 20 to arrange for

him a meeting with Mr Molotov.

Still anxious to avoid unconditional surrender to the USA, Togo sent ex-premier

Hirotake Hirota to see Malik on June 3. He stressed Japan's desire to improve her relations with the USSR. A second meeting took place on the following day, and two further meetings on June 24.

[IVOVSS, vol. V, pp. 536-7.]

The History dismisses all these Hirota visits to Malik and his offers of large-scale Soviet-Japanese economic co-operation as "a piece of effrontery coming from a gang guilty of so many treacherous acts towards the Soviet Union"; but the fact remains that Malik consented to see Hirota four times.

Nevertheless, the Hirota mission failed, and the Japanese Government now tried to

establish direct contact with the Soviet Government in Moscow. The Emperor decided to send Prince Konoye to Moscow on July 12, and Mr Sato, the Japanese Ambassador in

Moscow was instructed to inform the Soviet Government of the Emperor's desire. But in vain. In the words of the History:

This Japanese proposal was left without an answer by the Soviet Government which

was, moreover, preparing to go to the Big-Three Conference at Potsdam. Here the

Soviet delegation fully informed its allies of these Japanese "peace" moves. Thus, the Japanese imperialists' attempts to split the Allies failed completely.

[IVOVSS, vol. V, p. 538.]

At Potsdam the American military wanted to know when exactly the Russians would

attack in the Far East. The Soviet Chief of Staff, General Antonov confirmed that all would be ready by August 8, but much depended on the outcome of the Soviet-Chinese

talks which had begun in Moscow shortly before the Potsdam Conference.

As we now know, the Americans were, in fact, no longer interested at the time of

Potsdam in Russian participation in the war against Japan. Churchill tells with

undisguised glee how he and Harry Truman fooled Stalin.

As Churchill tells the story:

On July 17 (at Potsdam) world-shaking news arrived... "It means", Stimson said,

"that the experiment in the Mexican desert has come off. The atomic bomb is a reality".

And almost the first thought that occurred to Churchill was that the Russians could be dispensed with in the war against Japan:

We should not need the Russians. The end of the Japanese war no longer depended

on the pouring in of their armies... We had no need to ask favours of them... I

minuted to Mr Eden: " It is quite clear that the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan."

There was no doubt, he wrote, that the bomb would be used.