Russian History: A Very Short Introduction

This was the constellation of great powers which Russia joined in the 18th century. The response of European countries was ambivalent. From the early 18th century, and especially after the Seven Years War (1756–63), no one could deny that Russia was a member of the European ‘club’: its military victories spoke for themselves. All the same, Europe’s elites still regarded Russia as being in some way alien: its sheer size and massive population, its immense resources, its military might, its semi-Asiatic geography, its ever-expanding frontiers, and its uncertain ambitions all inclined European statesmen to regard it with suspicion and distrust.

Russia really had no choice but to make itself amenable to this disdainful ‘club’. To defend its long and mostly open frontiers, to deal with threats of sedition among its very diverse populations, Russia needed not only a powerful army and navy, but also friendly relations with its European neighbours, sometimes achieved by royal marriages. It also needed where possible to gain confidential knowledge of European powers’ intentions and capabilities.

For that reason, from Peter I onwards, Russia’s statesmen gave priority to training noblemen in European languages and sending them on tours around the European capitals to participate in polite society and to get to know the intentions of the courts and the peoples’ customs. The new Cadet Corps which trained future army officers in ballistics and fortification also taught them music, dancing, social etiquette, and foreign languages. Graduates spoke excellent French and were soon to be found mixing gracefully with high society in France and Germany. Moreover, Catherine II herself as Empress corresponded with Voltaire and Diderot, two leading thinkers of the European Enlightenment.

The inevitable result was to create a yawning gap between the way of life of the ordinary people and that of Russia’s elites, who gradually became more numerous during the 18th and 19th centuries. This gap was especially damaging to the church, whose culture changed far less than that of secular elites.

The effort seemed to pay off, though. In the 18th century, Russia had remarkable military and diplomatic successes. The greatest geostrategic obstacle to its great power position was its land-locked location. Despite its immense size, it could conduct sea trade with Europe only through the Gulf of Finland or the White Sea, both of which could become iced over in winter. Having gained the former Baltic provinces of Sweden, Russia dismembered the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and annexed its capital, Warsaw, through diplomatic agreements with Austria and Prussia.

The Ottoman Empire still dominated the Black Sea, which became Russia’s prime target during the 18th and early 19th centuries. Russia gained a series of victories over the Ottomans, annexed the Crimea (the first Ottoman Muslim territory to fall under Christian control), colonized fertile lands on the Black Sea coast, and established the major port of Odessa to carry the new international trade through the Bosphorus. Its army was, however, unable to advance as far as Constantinople because of geographical obstacles: the swampy Danube delta, rivers, and mountains. The alternative route to Turkey through the Caucasus was rendered hazardous by the mountain peoples, most of whom were Muslim or converted to Islam in the course of facing Russian aggression. Moreover, Russia knew that any final offensive directed at Constantinople would risk dragging other European powers into a general war which would overstrain Russia’s resources.

‘Regularizing’ the state