Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (Strategy and History)

88 See for instance Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, Chapter 2; Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, Chapter 1; Deborak Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, Chapter 3; and M.L.R. Smith, ‘Strategy in an Age of “Low Intensity” Warfare’, in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds), Rethinking the Nature of War, Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005.

89 Hallion, op. cit., p. 48.

90 Hammond, op. cit., p. 106.

91 Hallion, op. cit., p. 18.

92 Lambeth, op. cit., p. 69; Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Excellence, The Evolution of Operational Theory, London: Frank Cass, 1997, p. 254.

93 Lambeth, op. cit., pp. 54–5.

94 Ibid., pp. 55–6.

95 See James Fallows, National Defense, New York: Random House, 1981, pp. 15–17.

96 Burton, op. cit., p. 43.

97 Brodie, op. cit., p. 458.

98 See Paul Johnston, ‘Doctrine is not Enough: the Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies’, Parameters, Autumn 2000, pp. 30–9, for a short if somewhat too rosy account of this change in atmosphere.

99 See Lambeth, op. cit., pp. 59–81.

100 Weighley (1973), pp. 475–7.

101 Andrew Latham, ‘A Braudelian Perspective on the Revolution in Military Affairs’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 8 (2), June 2002, p. 238.

102 Peter Faber, ‘The Evolution of Airpower Theory in the United States’, in John Olson (ed.), Asymmetric Warfare, Oslo: Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy Press, 2002, p. 109.

103 Coram, op. cit., p. 322.

104 Hammond, op. cit., p. 154.

105 Ibid., p. 17. See also Coram, op. cit., p. 309; and Cowan, op. cit., p. 17.

106 Cowan, op. cit., p. 19.

107 Ibid., pp. 23–8; Hammond, op. cit., pp. 195–6; Coram, op. cit., Chapters 27–8.

108 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1997, p. 74.

109 Ibid., p. 77.

110 John Schmitt, ‘Command and (Out of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity Theory’, in David Alberts and Thomas Czerwinski, Complexity, Global Politics and National Security, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998, Chapter 9.

111 Ibid., preface, p. 2.

112 See General Donn A. Starry, ‘Tactical Evolution – FM 100–5’, Military Review, August 1978, pp. 2–11, for an account by one of the leading senior officers of this reorientation process.

113 Richard Lock-Pullan, ‘ “An Inward Looking Time”: The United States Army, 1973–1976’, The Journal of Military History, 67, April 2003, p. 485.

114 Ibid., pp. 486–90. See for a contemporary feeling of the mood, for instance Major Marc B. Powe, ‘The US Army After The Fall of Vietnam’, Military Review, February 1976, pp. 3–17.

115 See for instance William (Bill) Lind, ‘Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army’, Military Review, March 1977, pp. 54–65; Archer Jones, ‘The New FM 100–5: A View From the Ivory Tower’, Military Review, February 1977, pp. 27–36; Major John M. Oseth, ‘FM 100–5 Revisited: A Need for Better “Foundations Concepts”?’, Military Review, March 1980, pp. 13–19; Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege and Lieutenant Colonel L.D. Holder, ‘The New FM 100–5’, Military Review, July 1982, pp. 24–35.

116 Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The US Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia, US Army Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002, pp. v, 4. Donn Starry too saw this as one of the merits of the 1976 version of FM 100–5.

117 Captain Anthony Coroalles, ‘Maneuver to Win: A Realistic Alternative’, Military Review, September 1981, p. 35.

118 Ibid. Coroalles for instance refers to an article in The Marine Corps Gazette of December 1979 titled ‘Winning Through Maneuver’ by Captain Miller.

119 See, for instance, Colonel Wayne A. Downing, ‘Firepower, Attrition, Maneuver, US Army Doctrine: A Challenge for the 1980s and Beyond’, Military Review, January 1981, pp. 64–73; Roger Beaumont, ‘On the Wehrmacht Mystique’, Military Review, January 1981, pp. 44–56; Archer Jones, ‘FM 100–5: A view from the Ivory Tower’, Military Review, May 1984, pp. 17–22; Major General John Woodmansee, ‘Blitzkrieg and the AirLand Battle’, Military Review, August 1984, pp. 21–39; Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, ‘How to Change an Army’, Military Review, November 1984, pp. 32–49; Captain Antulio J. Echevarria II, ‘Auftragstaktik: in its Proper Perspective’, Military Review, October 1986, pp. 50–6; Daniel Hughes, ‘Abuses of German Military History’, Military Review, December 1986, pp. 66–76; Major General Edward Atkeson, ‘The Operational Level of War’, Military Review, March 1987, pp. 28–36.

120 Coroalles, op. cit., pp. 37–8. See for reference to Boyd and the OODA loop in the development of US Army doctrine also Naveh, op. cit., pp. 256–62, 297, 301.

121 Ibid., p. 38.