The atmosphere of fear and unpredictability choked nearly everyone into compliance with whatever Stalin was demanding. Just a few Soviet leaders dared to object to what he said. Two of these were Georgi Zhukov and Nikolai Voznesenski. Yet Stalin intimidated even Zhukov. He also exasperated him. Stalin, Zhukov noted, had taken time to understand the need for careful preparation of military operations by professional commanders. He was like a ‘fist-fighter’ in discussion when better results could have been obtained by more comradely methods.17
He was also arbitrary in his appointment and replacement of commanders, acting on the basis of partial information or of mischievous suggestions. The morale of commanding officers would have been higher if he had not meddled in this way.18Stalin’s other subordinates had learned to keep their heads down. ‘When I went to the Kremlin,’ said Ivan Kovalëv about his wartime experience in the post of People’s Commissar of Communications,
Molotov, Beria and Malenkov would usually be in Stalin’s office. I used to feel they were in the way. They never asked questions, but sat there and listened, sometimes jotting down a note. Stalin would be busy issuing instructions, talking on the phone, signing papers… and those three would go on sitting there.19
Stalin’s visitors’ diary makes it clear that these three saw him more frequently than any other politicians. Mikoyan had a theory about this. He hypothesised that Stalin kept Molotov in his office because he feared what Molotov might get up to if he was allowed to be by himself.20
Mikoyan had a point even if he exaggerated it. Stalin had to include others in affairs of state and they in turn had to know what was afoot. Needless to add, he did not give a damn that the main state leaders would be dog-tired by the time they got to their People’s Commissariats and started at last to deal with their own business.He trusted none of his politicians and commanders. Even Zhukov, his favourite military leader, was the object of his disquiet: Stalin instructed Bogdan Kobulov in the NKVD to put a listening device in his home. Seemingly the same was done to Stalin’s old comrades Voroshilov and Budënny. His suspicions were boundless.21
Having ordered Dmitri Pavlov’s execution in the early days of the war, Stalin was little more satisfied with Ivan Konev, Pavlov’s successor on the Western Front. Konev’s failure to bring an immediate halt to the German advance was reason enough to question his loyalty. Stalin was all for shooting him. Zhukov was no friend of Konev’s but thought such a fate completely undeserved. He had had to plead with Stalin to relent.22 Zhukov was being taught that absolutely no commander was secure in post and life.Stalin knew he could not do without Zhukov from October 1941. German tank corps had reached the outskirts of Moscow and German bombers flew over the city. Soviet regular forces were hurried out to meet the threat. Panic seized the minds of ordinary citizens, and the NKVD rounded up those who tried to flee. The factories and offices hardly shut for the duration of the battle. Stalin and Zhukov conferred:23
Having assured the Supreme Commander that Moscow would not fall, Zhukov had to fulfil his commitment regardless of difficulties.
When sending telegrams to Stalin and phoning him from the field, Zhukov addressed him as ‘Comrade Supreme Commander’.24
The nomenclature was a typical Soviet mishmash: Zhukov had to refer to him as a fellow communist as well as a commander. Stalin kept up the proprieties in return. Even in emergencies he often avoided giving orders in his own name. Phoning through to his generals on the various fronts, he was inclined to say some such phrase as ‘the Committee of Defence and Stavka very much request the taking of all possible and impossible measures’.25 Zhukov remembered these evasive niceties many years later.