Сталин и Гитлер

115. J. A. Armstrong (ed.) Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison, Wise. 1964), pp. 98–103, 662; Grenkevich, Soviet Partisan Movement, pp. 92–3.

116. Geddes, Nichivö, pp. 87–95.

117. Mallmann, ‘Sicherheitspolizei und “Bandenkampf”’, p. 503.

118. T. Anderson ‘Incident at Baranivka: German Reprisals and the Soviet Partisan Movement in the Ukraine, October-December 1941’, Journal of Modern History, 71 (1999), pp. 611–13.

119. K. Lutzel Deutsche Soldaten – nationalsozialistischer Krieg? Kriegserlebnis und Kriegserfahrung (Paderborn, 1998), p. 184.

120. Mallmann, ‘Sicherheitspolizei und “Bandenkampf”’, pp. 513–14; see too B. Shepherd ‘The Continuum of Brutality: Wehrmacht

Security Divisions in Central Russia, 1942’, German History, 21 (2003), pp. 60–63.

121. R. Rhodes Masters of Death: the SS Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust (New York, 2002), pp. 219–20.

122. Public Record Offi ce, London, WO 311/45, letter from Judge-Advocate General Western Command Branch to Military Dept., Judge-Advocate General’s offi ce, 1 May 1945, p. 1.

123. See for example M. Mazower ‘Military Violence and National Socialist Values: The Wehrmacht in Greece 1941–1944’, Past & Present, 134 (1992), pp. 129–58; W. Manoschek ‘The Extermination of Jews in Serbia’, in U. Herbert (ed.) National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies (Oxford, 2000), pp. 163–85.

124. Gorinov, ‘Muscovites’ Moods’, p. 119.

125. Weiner, Making Sense of War, pp. 172–3.

126. Weiner, Making Sense of War, pp. 177–9.

127. S. Bialer (ed.) Stalin and his Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II (New York, 1969), pp. 140–41, 143–8.

128. Soviet fi gures in Harrison, The Soviet Union’, p. 285. The armed forces employed 7.1 million in 1941, 11.3 million in 1942, 11.9 million in 1943 and 12.2 million in 1944. German fi gures from H.-U. Thamer Verführung und Gewalt: Deutschland 1933–1945 (Berlin, 1986), p. 718. The numbers conscripted by 1942 were 9.4 million, 1943 11.2 million, 1944 12.4 million.

129. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties, pp. 85–91.

130. Sokolov, The Cost of War’, pp. 175–6, 187.

131. Bessonov, Tank Rider, p. 44; W. S. Dunn Hitler’s Nemesis: the Red Army 1933–1945 (Westport, Conn., 1994), pp. 62–4; R. Thurston ‘Cauldrons of Loyalty and Betrayal: Soviet Soldiers’ Behaviour 1941 and 1945’, in Thurston and Bonwetsch, People’s War, pp. 239–40; J. Erickson ‘Red Army Battlefi eld Performance, 1941–45: the System and the Soldier’, in P. Addison and A. Calder (eds) Time to Kill: the Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, 1939–1945 (London, 1997), pp. 237–41, 247–8.

132. On the Soviet balance between men and military equipment see J. Sapir The Economics of War in the Soviet Union during World War II’, in I. Kershaw and M. Lewin (eds) Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 219– 21; S. J. Zaloga and J. Grandsen Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles in World War II (London, 1984), pp. 146–9, 160–62. On Germany’s capital-manpower ratio see, for example, R. L. di Nardo Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism: Horses and the German Army in World War II (London, 1991), pp. 37–56, 92–7; R.M. Orgorkiewicz Armoured Forces: a history of armoured forces and their vehicles (London, 1970), pp. 74–9. In general O. Bartov Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1991), ch. 2.

133. Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces, pp. 123–4; Zaloga and Grandsen, Soviet Tanksy pp. 146–9, 160–62.

134. V. Hardesty Red Phoenix: the Rise of Soviet Air Power 1941–1945 (London, 1982), pp. 83–8; M. O’Neill The Soviet Air Force, 1917–1991’, in R. Higham and F. W. Kagan (eds) The Military History of the Soviet Union (New York, 2002), pp. 159–62.

135. van Tuyll, Feeding the Bear, pp. 156–7; J. Beaumont Comrades in Arms: British Aid to Russia, 1941–1945 (London, 1980), pp. 210–12.

136. D. R. Beachley ‘Soviet Radio-Electronic Combat in World War IF, Military Review, 61 (1981), pp. 67–8.

137. Koschorrek, Blood Red Snow, p. 64.

138. D. Kahn Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York, 1978), pp. 440–41.

139. Liebermann, ‘Crisis Management’, pp. 61–6; Bialer, Stalin and his Gen-erals, pp. 352–4, 350–51.

140. See P. Schramm Hitler the Man and the Military Leader (London, 1972), pp. 194–205, Appendix II ‘Memorandum on Hitler’s Leadership, 1946’ by Col. A. JodI; W. Warlimont The German High Command during World War IP, in D. Detweiler (ed.) World War II German Military Studies (24 vols, New York, 1979) vol. vi, pp. 6–59. On the record of his meetings on technical and economic issues see W. A. Boelcke (ed.) Deutschlands Rüstungim Zweiten Weltkrieg: Hitlers Konferenzen mit Albert Speer (Frankfurt am Main, 1969); IWM, Box S363, Kartei des Technischen Amtes, 1941–4, pp. 1–24: ‘Liste von Rüstungs-Besprechungen bei Adolf Hitler, 1940–1945’.

141. B. Bonwetsch ‘Stalin, the Red Army, and the “Great Patriotic War”’ in Kershaw and Lewin, Stalinism and Nazism, pp. 203–6; Overy, Russia’s War, pp. 187–90.