Stuka Pilot

Experiments with Ju. 88s armed with a large calibre cannon are soon abandoned as the difficulties which arise hold out no promise of success. Also one operational flight undertaken with Ju. 87s results only in losses. The majority of our establishment is skeptical; what impresses me is the possibility of being able to shoot with an accuracy of within 20-30 cm. If this is attainable one should be able to hit the easily vulnerable parts of the tank provided one could get within close enough range—that is my conviction. From visual models we learn to recognize infallibly the various types of Russian tank and are taught where the most vulnerable parts are located: engine, petrol tank, ammunition chamber. Merely to hit a tank is not enough to destroy it, it is necessary to hit a particular spot (i.e. petrol or ammunition) with incendiary or explosive stuff. So a fortnight passes; then the Ministry wishes to know whether we are ready for an immediate transfer to the Crimea. The Soviets are exerting heavy pressure and there we shall certainly have a wider and better field for the practical test of our theories. To fly in at low level and then open fire from a few yards above the ground is impossible on a stabilized front with strong A.A. emplacements; we know that much because the losses are greater than the results. We shall only be able to use this weapon, if at all, where the front, and consequently the A.A. defense, is on the move. Flt./Lt. Steppe stays behind at Briansk and will follow us later. I fly over Konotop and Nikolajew with all serviceable aircraft to Kertsch on the Crimean peninsula. At Kertsch I meet up with my wing and it wrings my heart to see the old faces again and for the time being no longer to be one of them. They are bombing the hotly contested bridgehead at Krymskaja. Comrades tell me that Soviet tanks which have broken through are advancing not more than a mile or so beyond the old main battle line. This means then that we shall have to attack them while they are still covered by the sited, and therefore heavy, flak defense of their own front line.

The A.A. in this battle area is concentrated in a very restricted space. After the end of the fighting near the oilfields not far from the Caspian Sea where the Soviet oil centre lies, practically all their A.A. artillery has been brought up from those distant areas and concentrated here. They have traveled up through Mosdok—Piatigorsk—Armawir—Krasnodar. On one of the first days after our arrival we already make the first test south of Krymskaja. Tanks which have broken through are located 800 yards in front of their own main line. We find them at once and are eager to see what can be done. It is mighty little, for I am still flying above our own front line when I receive a direct hit by flak. Other aircraft fare no better. Now in addition enemy fighters arrive on the scene, an old production series of Spitfires. This is the first time I have met this type of aircraft in Russia. One of our young pilot officers is brought down in an orchard. He turns up the same evening with fruit and diarrhea.

After this beginning and the feeble results of our first test the outlook is none too rosy. We are the object of commiseration wherever we appear, and our sympathizers do not predict a long lease of life for any of us. The heavier the flak, the quicker my tactics develop. It is obvious that we must always carry bombs to deal with the enemy defense. But we cannot carry any on our cannon-carrying aircraft as the bomb load makes them too heavy. Besides, it is no longer possible to go into a dive with a cannon-carrying Ju. 87 because the strain on the wing planes is too great. The practical answer is therefore to have an escort of normal Stukas.

A fresh Soviet assault offers us the opportunity to initiate this important new departure. N.E. of Temjruk the Soviets are endeavoring to turn the Kuban front. They begin to ferry parts of two divisions across the lagoons in the hope of bringing about by this maneuver the collapse of the Kuban front. We have only isolated strongpoints with a very thin support line holding the marshland and the lagoons N.E. of Temjruk. Naturally their striking power is limited, and in no way a match for this new Soviet operation.