Свобода воли. Иллюзия или возможность

115. Pereboom D. 2013b. Free Will // Crisp R. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 606–637.

116. Pereboom D. 2014a. Responses to John Martin Fischer and Dana Nelkin // Science, Religion, and Culture. Vol. 1. № 3. P. 218–225.

117. Pereboom D. 2014b. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. N.Y: Oxford University press.

118. Pereboom D. 2017. Replies to Victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Al Mele // Criminal Law and Philosophy. Vol. 11. № 3. P. 617–636.

119. Perry J. 1978. A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

120. Perry J. 2002. Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.

121. Pinker S. 2002. The Bank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. London: Penguin Books.

122. Psillos S. 2009. Regularity Theories // Beebee H., Hitchcock C., and Menzies P. (eds.). Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. P. 131–157.

123. Putnam H. 1967. Psychological Predicates // Capitan W.H. and Merrill D.D. (eds.). Art, Mind, and Religion. University of Pittsburgh Press. P. 37–48.

124. Reid M. 1997. Narrative and Fission: A Review of Marya Schechtman’s The Constitution of Selves // Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 10. № 2. P. 211–219.

125. Reid T. 1969. Essay on the Intellectual Power of Man. Boston: MIT Press.

126. Reid T. 2008. Of Mr. Locke’s Account of our Personal Identity // Perry J. (ed.). Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press. P. 113–118.

127. Rigoni D., Kühn S., et al. 2012. Reducing Self-Control by Weakening Belief in Free Will // Consciousness and Cognition. Vol. 21. P. 1482–1490.

128. Roberts J. 1989. Aristotle on Responsibility for Action and Character // Ancient Philosophy. Vol. 9. № 1. P. 23–36.

129. Ross D. 2000. Rainforest Realism: A Dennettian Theory of Existence // Ross D., Brook A., Thompson D. (eds.) Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. Cambridge: MIT Press. P. 147–166.

130. Sapolsky R. 2004. The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System // Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B. Biological Science. Vol. 359. No 1451. P. 1787–1796.

131. Schechtman M. 2004. Personality and Persistence: The Many Faces of Personal Survival // American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 41. № 2. P. 87–105.

132. Schechtman M. 2007. The Constitution of Selves. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

133. Schechtman M. 2011. The Narrative Self // S. Gallagher (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 394–416.

134. Schechtman M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

135. Searle J. 1994. The Rediscovery of Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.

136. Searle J. 1997. The Mystery of Consciousness. N.Y.: New York Review of Books.

137. Searle J. 1998. Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World. N.Y.: Basic Books.

138. Searle J. 1999. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

139. Searle J. 2003. Rationality in Action. Cambridge: Bradford Book.

140. Searle J. 2004. Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

141. Searle J. 2006. Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. N.Y.: Columbia University Press.

142. Searle J. 2007. Biological Naturalism // Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (eds.). The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. P. 325–334.

143. Searle J. 2008. Philosophy in a New Century: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

144. Sellars W. 1991. Science, Perception and Reality. Atascadero: Ridgeview Pub. Co.

145. Shoemaker D. 2007. Moral Address, Moral Responsibility, and the Boundaries of The Moral Community // Ethics. Vol. 118. № 1. P. 70 – 108.

146. Shoemaker D. 2009. Responsibility and Disability // Metaphilosophy. Vol. 40. № 3–4. P. 438–461.

147. Shoemaker D. 2011a. Moral Responsibility and the Self // Gallagher S. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 487–518.

148. Shoemaker D. 2011b. Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility // Ethics. Vol. 121. № 3. P. 602–632.

149. Shoemaker D. 2013. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press.

150. Shoemaker D. 2016. Personal Identity and Ethics // The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .