Свобода воли. Иллюзия или возможность

1. Akelaitis A. 1945. Studies on the Corpus Callosum: IV Diagnostic Dyspraxia in Epileptics Following Partial and Compete Section of the Corpus Callosum // The American Journal of Psychiatry. Vol. 101. Issue 5. P. 594–599.

2. Atkins K. 2010. Narrative Identity and Moral Identity. A Practical Perspective. Oxford: Routledge.

3. Balaguer M. 2010. Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. Cambridge: A Bradford Book.

4. Baumeister R.F., Masicampo E.J., Dewall C.N. 2009. Prosocial Benefits of Feeling Free: Disbelief in Free Will Increases Aggression and Reduces Helpfulness // Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin. Vol. 35. Issue 2. P. 260–268.

5. Block N. 1990. Can the Mind Change the World? // Boolos G. (ed.). Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 137–170.

6. Block N. 2003. Do Causal Powers Drain Away? // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. 67. Issue 1. P. 133–150.

7. Brentano F. 1924. Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Erster Band. Leipzig: F. Meiner.

8. Chalmers D. 1997. The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

9. Chisholm R. 1964. Human Freedom and The Self. The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas.

10. Chisholm R. 1991. On the Simplicity of the Soul // Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 5, Philosophy of Religion. P. 167–181.

11. Christman J. 2004. Narrative Unity as a Condition of Personhood // Metaphilosophy. Vol. 35. № 5. P. 695–713.

12. Churchland P. 2013. Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Selves. New York.

13. Colyvan M. 1998. Can the Eleatic Principle Be Justified? // Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 28. № 3. P. 313–335.

14. Cornell D., Warren J., Hawk G. et al. 1996. Psychopathy in Instrumental and Reactive Violent Of enders // Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. Vol. 64. № 4. P. 783–790.

15. Crane T. 1992. Mental Causation and Mental Reality // Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Vol. 92. P. 185–202.

16. Crane T. 2001. Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

17. Davidson D. 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

18. Davidson D. 2006a. Action, Rea sons, and Causes // The Essentia l Davidson. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. P. 23–36.

19. Davidson D. 2006b. Mental Events // The Essential Davidson. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. P. 105–121.

20. Dennett D. 1976. Conditions of Personhood // Rorty A (ed.). The Identities of Persons. Berkley: University of California Press. P. 175–196.

21. Dennett D. 1981. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

22. Dennett D. 1984. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

23. Dennett D. 1991a. Real Patterns // The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 88. № 1. P. 27–51.

24. Dennett D. 1991b. Consciousness Explained. Boston, Massachusetts: Little Brown & Co.

25. Dennett D. 1992. The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity // Kessel F., Cole P. and Johnson D. (eds.) Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. P. 103–115.

26. Dennett D. 1995. Darwin’s Dangerous Ideas. Evolution and the Meaning of Life. New York: Touchstone.

27. Dennett D. 1996. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

28. Dennett D. 1998. Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

29. Dennett D. 2003. Freedom Evolves. N.Y.: Penguin Books.

30. Dennett D. 2010. Two Black Boxes: A Fable // Activitas Nervosa Superior. Vol. 52. № 2. P. 81–84.

31. Dennett D. 2013. Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for T inking. N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company.

32. Dennett D. 2017. From Bacteria to Back and Back. The Evolution of Minds. N.Y.: Notron and Company.

33. Dennett D., Taylor C. 2011. Who’s Still Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities // Kane R. (ed.).The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition (2 ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 221–242.

34. Dretske F. 1991. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

35. Dretske F. 1993. Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior // Heil J. and Mele A. (eds.). Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. P. 121–136.

36. Duff A. 1977. Psychopathy and Moral Understanding // American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 14. № 3. P. 189–200.

37. Earman J. 1986. A Primer on Determinism. Boston: Springer.

38. Ehring D. 2009. Causal Relata // H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. P. 387–413.