Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

Unknown to Reinhardt, Höpner or von Bock, the Stavka had been assembling three new armies to mount a major counter-offensive, which Stalin approved on 30 November. Zhukov’s Western Front had General-leytenant Vasily I. Kuznetsov’s 1st Shock Army and General-Leytenant Andrei A. Vlasov’s 20th Army moving into position north of Moscow to strike the front of the Klin bulge. These two assault armies were plentifully equipped with infantry – roughly 60,000 – but had only limited artillery support (about thirty-six medium howitzers and fifty BM-13 Katyusha rocket launchers) and even less armour. Kuznetsov had one independent tank battalion (OTB) and Vlasov had the 24th Tank Brigade and one OTB; altogether, barely 100 tanks and no more than thirty were KV or T-34s. Kuznetsov did have one advantage, in that he held a sizeable bridgehead across the Moscow-Volga canal opposite the 6.Panzer-Division, which meant that the canal provided no real defensive benefit to the Germans. On the northern side of the Klin bulge, Konev’s Kalinin Front had General-major Dmitri D. Lelyushenko’s re-formed 30th Army prepared to play a major role in the counter-offensive. Lelyushenko had a mixed force with about 30,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry and about fifty tanks, of which no more than ten were KV or T-34s. Polkovnik Pavel A. Rotmistrov’s 8th Tank Brigade, reinforced with a rifle battalion, was intended to be the 30th Army’s main strike force – which was an indicator of just how depleted the Red Army’s tank forces were in Decenmber 1941.

At 0600 hours on 6 December, Lelyushenko began his offensive against Reinhardt’s Panzerarmee 3 from the north with a series of un-coordinated regimentalsize infantry and cavalry attacks against the Igel of the 14 and 36.Infanterie-Divisionen (mot.). The attacks were conducted before dawn in order to minimize the effectiveness of German defensive fires. Three of Lelyushenko’s rifle divisions and one cavalry division had just arrived from the Urals MD and went into battle shortly after detraining. Most of the Soviet attacks were repulsed since they were spread across a 50km-wide frontage and lacked mass. However, Rotmistrov, attacking in conjunction with the 365th Rifle Division, managed to force a German blocking detachment to evacuate the village of Zabolote, which created a gap in the 36.Infanterie-Division (mot.) sector. Rotmistrov’s tankers managed to advance over 8km on the next day, driving a shallow wedge behind the German defense at Klin. On the same day, Kuznetsov’s 1st Shock Army attacked the 6.Panzer-Division near Yakhroma with several rifle brigades, but failed to gain any ground. Reinhardt reacted to the Soviet counter-offensive by ordering 1.Panzer-Division to send a Panzer-Abteilung to block Rotmistrov from making any further penetration and he ordered Model’s XXXXI Armeekorps (mot.) to pull back from the Dmitrov-Yakhroma area to shorten the front.

On 8 December, the Soviet counter-offensive against the Klin bulge gathered momentum as Panzerarmee 3 continued to fall back toward Klin and Solnechnogorsk. The 14.Infanterie-Division (mot.) abandoned the important road intersection at Rogachevo without much of a fight, abandoning a great deal of equipment and damaged vehicles. Rotmistrov’s tank brigade continued to inch forward, widenening the gap in the German line, and late on 9 December he captured Yamuga, just 7km north of Klin. Reinhardt and von Bock seemed paralyzed – similar to the way Red Army commanders had reacted to the initial surprise attacks in June 1941 – and had difficulty determining whether they should try and hold fast or withdraw to defensible positions. Hitler would not approve any major retreats, but German commanders became adept at justifying minor ‘line straightening’ movements that were actually tactical withdrawals. Rokossovky’s 16th Army had also begun attacking Höpner’s Panzerarmee 4 at Krasnaya Polyana, preventing him from providing any significant aid to Reinhardt.