Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

By 10 December, the situation around Klin was becoming very dangerous for Reinhardt, once Rotmistrov cut the Klin-Volokolamsk road and attacked the LVI Armeekorps (mot.) headquarters 4km from Klin; Schaal was forced to use a rifle to defend his command post. Reinhardt’s troops kept falling back from village to village, until four of his divisions were clustered around Klin. Höpner sent part of the 2.Panzer-Division to help eject Rotmistrov’s brigade, but its departure from the front enabled Rokossovsky to recapture Istra and Solnechnogorsk on 11 December. By 12 December, it was apparent that the Soviet 30th Army and 1st Shock Army were bent on encircling the bulk of Panzerarmee 3 at Klin and that there was little that Reinhardt could do to stop it. Lelyushenko formed an operational maneuver group under Rotmistrov with the 8th and 21st Tank Brigades, an OTB and a motorcycle regiment, and instructed them to seal off Reinhardt’s escape route. Rotmistrov managed to come close to surrounding the 1, 2, 6, and 7.Panzer-Divisionen and 14.Infanterie-Division (mot.) but the Germans managed to mount a small attack at Nekrasino that kept the escape route open long enough for Reinhardt’s forces to escape westward, abandoning Klin on 15 December. Few if any prime movers were left, so most of the 8.8cm flak guns and artillery had to be abandoned; with few tanks or guns left, Reinhardt’s divisions were reduced to little more than infantry kampfgruppen.

The Battle of the Klin bulge had been catastrophic for Panzerarmee 3, resulting in about 2,500 personnel casualties and heavy material losses, including most of the artillery and vehicles. All five of Reinhardt’s motorized divisions were rendered combat-ineffective and were no longer capable even of defensive measures – instead, they continued retreating westward even though the Soviet pursuit could not keep up with them. At the same time, Konev’s Kalinin Front recaptured Kalinin on 16 December and put 9.Armee to flight. Heeresgruppe Mitte’s left flank was retreating in disarray. Von Bock directed Reinhardt to withdraw to the Konigsberg Line, but the retreat was more of a rout than an orderly operation. Lelyushenko managed an impressive victory at Klin despite very limited resources and time for planning, which was executed superbly at the tactical level by Rotmistrov. While far from reflective of Deep Battle doctrine, the 30th Army’s attack at Klin reflected a successful hybrid mix of tanks, infantry and cavalry that was the best that the Red Army could manage until industry replaced the losses of 1941.

At Tula, Guderian’s over-extended Panzerarmee 2 was quickly defeated in detail between 6–12 December as both his flanks were smashed in and he was forced to fall back again and again. The third Stavka reserve army, the 10th, suddenly appeared on Guderian’s eastern flank near Mikhailov and routed Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Armeekorps (mot.). The 10th Army advanced 30km in two days, slashing across Guderian’s lines of communication, and threatened to link up with the 50th Army attacking out of Tula, which would have resulted in the encirclement of von Schweppenburg’s XXIV Armeekorps (mot.). Guderian reacted promptly to the Soviet counter-offensive by ordering a rapid retreat and briefly created a new front between Tula and Yeifan, but when Timoshenko’s Southwest Front forced the 2.Armee to retreat toward Orel, Guderian was forced to fall back as well. As with Reinhardt’s Panzerarmee 3, Guderian’s retreat forced him to abandon artillery and vehicles which Germany could not replace.

At Tikhvin, the XXXIX Armeekorps (mot.) had been in an untenable position since mid-November due to the impossibility of supplying a motorized corps along a single trail across frozen marshland. Generalleutnant Hans-Jürgen von Arnim took over the corps at Tikhvin after General der Panzertruppe Rudolf Schmidt reported to the OKH that his troops were ‘on the brink of collapse’ due to the absence of winter uniforms and supplies. However, von Arnim’s arrival failed to alter the poor German situation and the Soviet 4th Army began a series of counterattacks that gradually pushed in the German flanks and interfered with ground lines of communication. The position of the Tikhvin garrison became critical and von Arnim was forced to request aerial resupply which, given the harsh weather conditions, would clearly be insufficient to keep a motorized corps in fighting trim. On 4 December, the Soviet 4th Army mounted a direct assault on the town of Tikhvin and the German lines began to buckle. On 8 December, von Arnim finally bowed to the inevitable, abandoning Tikhvin, and ordered a withdrawl to the Volkhov River. Although von Arnim’s forces escaped the Soviet pincers, the 8 and 12.Panzer-Divisionen were forced to abandon a great deal of equipment in the retreat, rendering them combat-ineffective. The liberation of Tikhvin cost the 4th Army 70 tanks.¹⁴⁶