Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

However, due to a variety of back-room political factors, Wa Pruef 6 favored the MAN design, which was powered by a petrol engine. Hitler was told that a diesel tank engine could not yet be manufactured in large quantities and that selecting the Daimler-Benz prototype would result in unacceptable production delays, so on 14 May he selected the MAN prototype to be the next German medium tank.¹⁸ The decision not to equip its next main battle tank with a diesel engine proved to be one of Germany’s most serious mistakes in armoured combat in the Second World War. Since fuel shortages were already crippling panzer operations by late 1941, the need for greater fuel efficiency was just as important as adding bigger guns and more armour to its tanks, but the Heereswaffenamt was oblivious to the impact that continued reliance on petrol engines would have on German mechanized operations. Hitler, who had already displayed sounder judgment than some of his engineers in pressing for a long-barreled gun on the Pz.III prior to the discovery of the T-34, regarded development of a diesel tank engine as a critical requirement for the Panzerwaffe, but the Heereswaffenamt and German industry managed to ignore his priorities. While Hitler’s decisions that led to German defeats are often highlighted, those where his judgement proved correct are often overlooked. After Germany’s defeat, it was convenient for German military and industrial leaders to dump all blame on Hitler’s head, which helped to conceal their own egregious errors of judgment.

Clearly the most notable fault – which directly impacted the ability of the Panzerwaffe to recover from the defeats of 1941 – was that German tank production remained ridiculously weak throughout the period of January–May 1942, with an average of 240 Pz.III and sixty–eighty Pz.IV built each month – a total of just 300–320 medium tanks. In addition, 36–45 StuG III assault guns were produced each month during the same period. Much of the blame for the inadequacy of German armaments production must fall on the head of Reichsminister Fritz Todt, the head of the Reichsministerium für Bewaffnung und Munition. In addition to new tanks, German industry rebuilt sixty-seven Pz.III and twenty-four Pz.IV during January–April 1942, which was not even enough to reequip a single panzer division. This half-hearted effort by German industry enabled the Soviets to seize an impressive 3–1 or better numerical advantage in tank production output, which they never lost. Thus, Todt’s death in an airplane crash on 8 February 1942 and his replacement by the capable Albert Speer can only be regarded as a lucky break for the Third Reich. While Speer’s impact on German tank production was too late to influence the 1942 campaign, his efforts to improve the efficiency of the German armaments industry would enable the Panzerwaffe to survive the losses of the 1942–43 campaigns.

Tank Skirmishes in the Crimea, 1 January–20 May

Although the Soviet Winter Counter-offensive culminated in early March, one place where the fighting continued virtually non-stop from January until the summer was in the Crimea. Both sides employed no more than a few hundred tanks and assault guns in the Crimea, but given the close-quarter fighting caused by the constrictive terrain, even small amounts of armour could make contributions well beyond the tactical level. The Soviet landings at Kerch and Feodosiya forced von Manstein to break off his attack on the fortress of Sevastopol and force-march the XXX Armeekorps eastward to contain the Soviet beachheads. This was the first time in the Second World War that the Wehrmacht had to react to a major enemy amphibious landing, but it was also the first time that the Red Army had conducted one. At the start of 1942 in the Crimea, both sides were in a race, with the Soviets trying to land more forces, including armour, to affect a breakout before the Germans could erect an impenetrable barrier across the narrow neck of the Kerch peninsula. Von Manstein requested a panzer unit to help crush the Soviet beachheads but the OKH had none to spare.

Von Manstein was at his best in a set-piece battle and, although he had no armoured support, the XXX Armeekorps had Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190 and the Luftwaffe still had some measure of air superiority over the Crimea, so Stuka support was available. Although the Soviet 44th Army had two weeks to fortify its position in Feodosiya and had the 79th OTB with T-26 light tanks, they were not expecting von Manstein’s weaker forces to counterattack. On 15 January 1942, the XXX Armeekorps suddenly attacked Feodosiya with heavy air and artillery support and within three days they had recaptured the port. It was a stinging tactical victory and von Manstein claimed that the 44th Army lost 16,700 troops and eighty-five tanks at Feodosiya.¹⁹