Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

Despite von Manstein’s success at Feodosiya – the only German victory in January 1942 – the Soviets managed to establish the Crimean Front under General-leytenant Dmitri T. Kozlov in the Kerch peninsula with the 44th, 47th and 51st Armies. In order to breach the German defensive line across the 13km-wide Parpach narrows, the Stavka sent Kozlov additional armour and artillery, as well as air support. Unlike other jury-rigged Red Army operations during the Winter Counter-offensive, Kozlov was provided the resources to mount a proper set-piece attack. However, the Parpach Narrows was one of the few places on the Eastern Front where the terrain enabled the Germans to establish defensive positions in accordance with their doctrinal norms; von Manstein’s infantry divisions were only required to hold 4–6km-wide fronts, not 20–25km as along much of the Eastern Front. By late February, Kozlov had nearly 200 tanks in the Kerch peninsula, including thirty-six KV-1 and twenty T-34, so he mounted a probing attack on 26 February, including the use of armour against the Romanian 18th Infantry Division.

However, heavy rains, marshy terrain and German minefields made it difficult for the Soviet tanks to advance and over the course of a week’s indecisive combat, Kozlov lost twenty-eight of his thirty-six KV-1 tanks and seven T-34s from the 39th and 40th Tank Brigades and 229th OTB. If ever there was a place where the KV-1 could fulfill its intended function as a breakthrough tank, it was in the Kerch peninsula, but it failed to deliver, despite the fact that the two opposing German infantry divisions had very limited anti-tank weaponry. Nor could von Manstein use 8.8cm flak guns in the front line, since they would be spotted in the flat terrain and destroyed by Soviet artillery. Instead, the German infantry relied upon large quantities of Tellermine 35 AT mines and the Soviet tendency to use KV-1s in small groups.

Prodded by Stalin to recommence his offensive, Kozlov decided to resume his attacks on 13 March after receiving another tank brigade and an independent tank regiment. With some 225 tanks available, as well as significant artillery support, Kozlov should have been able to dent, if not break, von Manstein’s front, which was held by only two German and one Romanian infantry divisions. Yet Kozlov had learned little from his first setback and he employed his armour in the same sector with exactly the same result: between 13–19 March the 39th Tank Brigade lost twenty-three of its twenty-seven tanks, the 40th Brigade lost eighteen tanks and the 56th Tank Brigade was shattered, losing eighty-eight of its ninety T-26 light tanks. Soviet tanks tried to advance over flat, open terrain and without the element of surprise, and then cross an obstacle belt that the Germans had covered with anti-tank fire. Although von Manstein’s anti-tank capabilities were modest, his troops managed to knock out more than half of Kozlov’s tanks in a week. The Luftwaffe also managed to intervene on occasion and the Kerch peninsula was no place for tankers without air cover, since there was no way for a tank battalion or brigade to avoid detection on the treeless steppe.