Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

By the time that Kozlov realized how badly the 44th Army’s front had been breached, German pioneers had almost completed filling in the anti-tank ditch clearing the way for 22.Panzer-Division. Kampfgruppe Groddeck, comprised of Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 22, a Panzerjäger-Abteilung, an assault-gun battery and some motorized infantry, moved out first, exploiting eastward toward Kerch. Cherniak committed the rest of his armour to local counterattacks against the German breach, which cost him twenty-six more light tanks. After midday on 9 May, the lead elements of 22.Panzer-Division began crossing the anti-tank ditch and moved northward, but a sudden heavy rain storm brought the attack to an abrupt halt by depriving the schwerpunkt of its air support. Despite the death of the commander of the Soviet 51st Army in a German air strike, Kozlov managed to shift the 40th Tank Brigade and 229th OTB into the path of the German panzer division, with fifty-three tanks including twenty-one KV-1. Yet when the rain stopped the next morning, the Luftwaffe easily spotted the Soviet heavy tanks and pulverized them – eleven KV-1 were knocked out and others immobilized. With the Soviet armour knocked about, the 22.Panzer-Division resumed its advance and quickly reached the Sea of Azov, cutting off the entire 51st Army. Kozlov’s last armour – the 55th Tank Brigade – mounted a futile, unsupported effort to stop 22.Panzer-Division on 10 May, but lost twenty-six of forty-six tanks, including all ten KV-1. After that, the Crimean Front began to disintegrate, with many troops surrendering and others fleeing to Kerch in hope of evacuation.

By 20 May, von Manstein’s forces had occupied Kerch and eliminated Kozlov’s Crimean Front in less than two weeks. At a cost of just 3,397 German casualties, three Soviet armies had been smashed and 175,000 troops lost. The Red Army lost four tank brigades and three OTBs with 238 tanks, including forty-one KV-1, against only eight tanks (one Pz.II, four Pz.III, three Pz.38(t)) from 22.Panzer-Division and three assault guns. Indeed, the Germans even managed to recover six of their tanks that had been lost in March and pressed into Soviet service. Operation Trappenjad was an exquisitely-executed set-piece offensive, with near-perfect use of a combined-arms schwerpunkt to quickly achieve decisive results. Although von Manstein had to return the 22.Panzer-Division and some of the Luftwaffe units to Heeresgruppe Süd for operations around Kharkov, he could now turn confidently to reduce fortress Sevastopol with no threat of other Soviet forces at his back.

Decision at Kharkov, 12–28 May 1942

Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock, who took over Heeresgruppe Süd in January 1942, had intended since February to mount a pincer attack utilizing the AOK 6 and some of von Kleist’s 1.Panzerarmee to cut off Timoshenko’s armies in the Barvenkovo salient, but had lacked the armour, air support or supplies to mount an enveloping operation. However, the OKH dispatched two panzer divisions and three infantry divisions to Heeresgruppe Süd in March, which restored some measure of its combat capabilities. By April, when Führer Directive 41 specified that the Barvenkovo salient had to be eliminated prior to the beginning of Operation Blau in June, von Bock’s staff developed operational plan Fridericus, which expected to use these forces to cut off the 75km-wide neck of the salient. According to the original plan, General der Panzertruppen Friedrich Paulus’ AOK 6 would launch the main attack from the north, while von Kleist provided Gruppe Mackensen, with the 14.Panzer-Division and 60.Infanterie-Division (mot.), to launch a supporting attack against the south side of the salient. Paulus was given the 3 and 23.Panzer-Division, which he kept in reserve near Kharkov. However, German logistics remained problematic even as warmer spring weather appeared, with Mackensen’s divisions having only 0.2 V.S. of fuel on 25 April. Von Bock allowed the date for Fridericus to slide into May and decided to allow von Manstein to conduct Trappenjad first, since AOK 11’s supply requirements were significantly less than the amount required for Fridericus. Once von Manstein crushed Kozlov’s Front, Paulus and Kleist would execute Fridericus.