Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

Unknown to von Bock, Timoshenko was planning his own offensive near Kharkov. Although Stalin and the Stavka expected the Germans to mount their next summer offensive against Moscow, they wanted to use the Red Army’s new tank units to mount offensives in other sectors to keep the Germans off balance and divert reserves from Heeresgruppe Mitte. Since Timoshenko had achieved one of the best successes in the winter counter-offensive, Stalin favoured his proposal to mount a large-scale double envelopment to encircle and destroy Paulus’ AOK 6 at Kharkov. However, Stalin was upset when Timoshenko requested 1,200 more tanks to conduct the operation, which indicates that Soviet armoured resources were still finite. Instead, Timoshenko was provided with 923 tanks, only 34 per cent of which were modern main battle tanks (eighty KV-1 and 239 T-34). Over 21 per cent of Timoshenko’s armour was composed of British-made Matilda II and Valentine tanks. Not only was one-third of Timoshenko’s armour comprised of T-60 light tanks of modest combat value, but he was forced to employ even obsolescent BT-2 and BT-5 light tanks in some tank brigades. Indeed, only six of Timoshenko’s nineteen tank brigades were equipped according to the 10March 1942 standard (ten KV-1, twentyT-34, twenty T-60).²¹ This is very interesting because it indicates that a high-priority Red Army offensive was provided only one-third of one month’s current production of KV-1 and T-34 tanks and had to make do with odds and ends, which begs the question – why didn’t the Stavka provide Timoshenko with better armoured resources? The logical explanation is that the Red Army was not receiving as many tanks as Soviet industry claimed to be producing at the time. Despite a purported 3–1 Soviet advantage in output of medium/heavy tanks over German output in spring 1942, Timoshenko only had a 2–1 numerical advantage on the battlefield at Kharkov and the German panzer units had a much higher proportion of medium tanks than the opposing Soviet tank brigades. Furthermore, the Germans were able to field 112 Pz.IIIJ and seventeen Pz.IVF2 at Kharkov, which for the first time provided panzer divisions with some ability to stand up to the T-34.

Timoshenko intended to conduct the northern pincer of his offensive with the 21st, 28th and 38th Armies from the Staryi Saltov bridgehead east of Kharkov and the southern pincer with the 6th Army in the Barvenkovo salient. After breaking through the German front lines, the 6th Army would commit a mobile group comprised of the new 21st and 23rd Tank Corps to envelop AOK 6 from the south, while the northern group committed the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps to envelop Kharkov from the other flank; Timoshenko expected the Soviet pincers to link up within four to five days of the beginning of the offensive. The Stavka hoped that Timoshenko’s Kharkov operation would be the Red Army’s first deliberate offensive of the Russo-German War, but Stalin was unwilling to commit the resources or time to realize this goal.

Superficially, Timoshenko tried to conduct an offensive that looked like the kind of Deep Battle operation envisioned in PU-36. However, his designated main effort – the 6th Army – was provided only 2.7 loads of fuel for its tanks, instead of the 7–8 loads that Stavka planners indicated were necessary. The amount of fuel and ammunition stockpiled in the Southwest Front was also inadequate to support a full-scale offensive for more than a few days.²² Coordination between the four Soviet armies involved in the offensive was minimal, with no overall commander appointed over the three northern armies. Yet the most egregious error in planning the Kharkov operation was the faulty intelligence provided on German dispositions and intentions. Timoshenko was completely unaware of the presence of some of the German reinforcements and he airily dismissed the presence of Paulus’ armoured reserve – the 3 and 23.Panzer-Divisionen – as irrelevant, since he claimed that the Soviet pincers would close around AOK 6 before Paulus had a chance to commit his armour to a counterattack. In essence, Timoshenko’s offensive was planned on a logistical shoestring, with inadequate C² and knowledge of the enemy, and simply assumed a static, immobile opponent.