Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

Timoshenko was oblivious to the German counter-offensive, partly due to the evasiveness of Kharitonov in reporting the scale of the disaster suffered by his army. Instead, Timoshenko was focused on 6th Army, finally achieving some measure of success with the commitment of the 21st and 23 rd Tank Corps, which pushed back both flanks of the German 113.Infanterie-Division and threatened to collapse the defense of the VIII Armeekorps. General-major Grigoriy I. Kuzmin’s 21st Tank Corps was able to overrun some German infantry positions but then ran into hardened resistance in the village of Ryabukhyne, where three StuG III assault guns and an 8.8cm flak battery knocked out thirty-four Soviet tanks. General-major Efim G. Pushkin’s 23rd Tank Corps had a bit more success, advancing 15km at the cost of just nine tanks, but a fresh German division – the 305.Infanterie-Division – arrived in time to prevent a complete breakthrough. Although German veterans often claimed that fresh Soviet units always seemed to appear just as their panzers were on the verge of victory, at Kharkov the boot was on the other foot. By late on 17 May, Timoshenko was aware that 9th Army was in serious trouble and, based upon recommendations from the Stavka, he decided to send Pushkin’s 23rd Tank Corps back to support Kharitonov’s forces. The diversion of his breakthrough force to deal with von Kleist took the wind out of 6th Army’s offensive and was typical of the kind of mistakes in battle command that degraded the performance of the Red Army’s armour in 1941–42.

Paulus was equally nervous about the possible collapse of his VIII Armeekorps under the hammer-blows of Soviet armour and diverted Kampfgruppe von Heydebreck (I/Pz.Regt 201) from 23.Panzer-Division and several more 8.8cm flak batteries to reinforce the faltering German infantry units. The first six of the long-awaited 7.5cm Pak 40 reached the 113.Infanterie-Division, providing a counter to the KV-1 and T-34 tanks.²⁶

Von Kleist completed the destruction of Kharitonov’s 9th Army on 18 May, with 14 and 16.Panzer-Divisionen slicing through Soviet infantry and cavalry units. Only thirty-one hours after Fridericus began, the lead German armour reached the Donets and captured the southern part of Izyum. A huge bulge had been pushed into the southern side of the Barvenkovo salient and there was less than 30km separating von Kleist’s spearheads from Paulus’ own assault group assembling near Balakleya on the north side of the salient. The Soviet 57th Army managed to refuse its left flank to prevent von Kleist from completely rolling up the Soviet rear areas, but Timoshenko now had to divert both tank corps and most of the 6th Army reserves to try and contain the German breakthrough. Incredibly, Timoshenko ordered the 6th Army to continue its offensive, as if the threat posed by von Kleist’s armour was a mere nuisance. Once the Soviet tank corps withdrew, Kampfgruppe von Heydebreck delivered a swift counterattack near Borki that caught a great deal of Soviet infantry and artillery in the open; the 6th Army offensive was halted.

With Soviet resistance disintegrating in front of him, von Kleist was able to leisurely resupply his panzers on 19 May and assemble 14 and 16.Panzer-Divisionen and 60.Infanterie-Division (mot.) into a powerful armoured fist, while his infantry divisions mopped up the 9th Army remnants. Timoshenko finally called off his own offensive on 19 May but, rather than massing his still considerable armoured forces to prevent von Kleist from sealing off the Barvenkovo salient, he committed the two tanks corps to a static defense near the village of Grushevakha, while clumsily trying to use the 57th Army’s rifle and cavalry to try and isolate von Kleist’s panzers. Von Kleist easily spotted the threat to his left flank and deftly transferred Hube’s 16.Panzer-Division to mount a sudden attack on the morning of 20 May that demolished the 2nd Cavalry Corps and pushed the 57th Army back 30km. Von Kleist then returned Hube’s division to his spearhead and resumed the advance northward to cut off the Barvenkovo salient. Mackensen’s III Armeekorps (mot.) encountered stiff resistance near Mar’evka on 21 May, where a tank melee developed between Pushkin’s 23rd Tank Corps and Hube’s 16.Panzer-Division. This was one of the few large tank-vs.-tank actions of the Second Battle of Kharkov and Hube lost twenty-one tanks, but managed to capture the town and force the Soviet tankers to retreat.