Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

Nervous about the obvious German military build-up along the Lithuanian border, General-polkovnik Fyodor I. Kuznetsov, commander of the Baltic Military District (soon to be redesignated the Northwest Front) attempted to improve the readiness of his command, even without specific guidance from Moscow. Under the guise of an exercise, Kuznetsov decided to move General-major Nikolai M. Shestopalov’s 12th Mechanized Corps forward from Riga and Liepaja and concentrate it around Siauliai on 19–20 June 1941. Kuznetsov wanted Shestopalov’s armour within 60km of the border to support the three rifle divisions the 8th Army had deployed along the border. These three rifle divisions were required to screen a 155km-wide front along the border with units at only 60 per cent strength, which meant they were little more than a tripwire.² While Shestopalov’s corps was in a better position at Siauliai to respond to a border incident, the hastily-conducted move consumed most of the unit’s on-hand fuel and left the corps fuel depot in Riga 190km in the rear. Since the 12th Mechanized Corps had less than half its authorized number of fuel trucks, it would take multiple convoys back to Riga to refuel the tanks at Siauliai. Furthermore, a large number of tanks and other vehicles fell out on the march due to technical defects, so it would take a few days to bring the 12th Mechanized Corps up to readiness. Once the 12th Mechanized Corps was en route to Siauliai, Kuznetsov issued other orders to the 8th Army to begin laying minefields on the border and prepare bridges for demolition. When General Georgy Zhukov, chief of the Soviet general staff in Moscow, heard about Kuznetsov’s unauthorized movements of armour and defense preparations he exploded with anger and ordered him to repeal the orders. Zhukov even stooped to calling Kuznetsov’s efforts to evacuate family members ‘an act of cowardice’ and accused him of trying to ‘spread panic among the people’. With no small amount of courage – and personal risk – Kuznetsov ignored Zhukov and established a tactical command post in the woods south of Dvinsk (Daugavpils).

At X-zeit (X-hour), 0400 hours (local time) on 22 June, Heeresgruppe Nord began crossing the Lithuanian border, with Generaloberst Höpner’s Panzergruppe 4 and ten infantry divisions from 18.Armee. General der Panzertruppen Georg-Hans Reinhardt’s XXXXI Armeekorps (mot.) crossed the border just south of Taurogen with the 1.Panzer-Division on the left and the 6.Panzer-Division on the right, with the 36.Infanterie-Division (mot.) trailing. The 1.Panzer-Division attacked directly into the town of Taurogen with Kampfgruppe Westhoven, while Kampfgruppe Kruger enveloped the town and crossed the Jura River at an unguarded ford. Thanks to Kuznetsov’s last-minute alerts, the 125th Rifle Division put up a tough fight for Taurogen and the panzers were slowed by mines and anti-tank fire; Taurogen was not secured until 2000 hours. In clearing the city, 1.Panzer-Division expended a great deal of ammunition and lost the better part of a day, while much of the 125th Rifle Division actually succeeded in escaping to the northeast. While the 1.Panzer-Division was clearing Taurogen, Generalmajor Franz Landgraf’s 6.Panzer-Division moved past some anti-tank ditches on the east side of the town with Kampfgruppe Raus and Kampfgruppe Seckendorff and advanced northeast, directly toward Siauliai, although they had no knowledge of Soviet armour being there. The 48th Rifle Division, armed only with training ammunition as part of Kuznetsov’s impromptu mobilization exercise, was easily brushed aside. Overall, Höpner’s plan to use a panzer division to seize the border city of Taurogen was ill-conceived and ultimately limited the XXXXI Armeekorps (mot.) to a 30km penetration on the first day of Barbarossa, which merely pushed the enemy back rather than encircling them.

In contrast to Reinhardt’s methodical attack through the Soviet border defenses, General der Infanterie Erich von Manstein’s LVI Armeekorps (mot.) avoided Soviet resistance centers by advancing cross-country, almost due east, toward Kedainiai, with 8.Panzer-Division’s Kampfgruppe Crissoli way out in front, followed at some distance by 3.Infanterie-Division (mot.) and 290.Infanterie-Division.³ Manstein was focused on his objective – the bridges over the Dvina River 300km away – and essentially ignored Soviet forces that did not directly block his path. Consequently, Manstein’s lead division advanced 70km through heavily wooded terrain on the first day and had no significant contact with Soviet forces.