Although stunned by the Soviet counterattack at Raseiniai, Reinhardt spent the day skillfully directing the 1.Panzer-Division and 36.Infanterie-Division (mot.) around Solyankin’s open flank. Meanwhile, Manstein’s 8.Panzer-Division had marched almost unopposed into Kedainiai, overrunning Solyankin’s rear area units. By nightfall on 24 June, Solyankin’s 2nd Tank was enveloped on both flanks. The next morning, Solyankin attempted a breakout with his remaining heavy tanks in the lead, which caused 1.Panzer-Division some tense moments when Kampfgruppe Westhoven was attacked by KV heavy tanks near Vosiliskis. Once again, the panzerjägers were unable to stop the Soviet heavy tanks and the Germans were forced to use 8.8cm flak and 10cm howitzers in the anti-tank role. Afterwards, Reinhardt spent the next day reducing the encircled 2nd Tank Division and Solyankin was killed in action on 26 June. While the Battle of Raseiniai was a Soviet defeat, Solyankin’s division had effectively held up Reinhardt’s entire corps for three whole days.
By the time that the 2nd Tank Division was surrounded at Raseiniai, Shestopalov’s 12th Mechanized Corps was nearly surrounded near Kaltinenai by German infantry from the I and XXVI Armeekorps. The Soviet 23rd and 28th Tank Divisions fought doggedly against the AOK 18 on 24–25 June, but their T-26 and BT-7 light tanks were rapidly picked off by German panzerjägers. After two days of combat, the corps exhausted its supplies and was reduced to about 20 per cent of its armour. Recognizing that his forces were too weak to hold Lithuania, never mind throw the Germans back across the border, Kuznetsov ordered Shestopalov and the remaining infantry from the 8th Army to withdraw north of the Dvina River. Chernyakhovsky conducted a skillful rearguard action with the remnants of his 28th Tank Division, enabling the bulk of the corps to escape. During the retreat, Shestopalov was wounded and then captured, dying soon afterward in German captivity.
By 0800 hours on 26 June, Manstein’s advance guard from 8.Panzer-Division had seized both the rail and road bridges over the Dvina at Daugavpils intact after a 315km march. While Manstein had accomplished his intermediate objective in just four days, he was in no position to exploit it. His bold dash had consumed 5.5 V.S. of fuel (545 tons) and, as a result, the 8.Panzer-Division was now immobilized for lack of fuel. In addition, the long-distance road march caused twenty-four tanks from Panzer-Regiment 10 to fall out due to mechanical defects.6
Reinhardt’s corps was still engaged around Raseiniai, 165km to the rear, and not in a position to support Manstein for several days. Kuznetsov directed the 21st Airborne Brigade to try and retake Daugavpils, while the Stavka dispatched General-major Dmitri Lelyushenko’s 21st Mechanized Corps from Idritsa to retake the bridges. Although Lelyushenko’s corps was little more than a cadre formation with no tanks and few vehicles, the VAMM in Moscow provided Lelyushenko with two tank battalions crewed by instructors and students; this added 105 BT-7 and two T-34 tanks to the 21st Mechanized Corps. In addition, the Stavka reinforced his corps on 23–24 June with a large shipment of 45mm anti-tank guns and the new 76.2mm USV gun.Lelyushenko quickly reorganized his incomplete corps into two combat groups, each with a tank battalion, a rifle battalion mounted on trucks and a mixed artillery/anti-tank battalion. He then set out on the 200km road march to Daugavpils on 25 June. Despite Luftwaffe attacks that destroyed some of his wheeled transport, Lelyushenko’s lead group reached the vicinity of Daugavpils within two days. At 0800 hours on 28 June, Lelyushenko attacked the 8.Panzer-Division’s forward positions northeast of Daugavpils with about sixty BT-7s, supported by some infantry and artillery. The German panzers were short of fuel but Lelyushenko’s tanks started the battle with very little ammunition and could not get anywhere near the bridges. Lelyushenko kept attacking all day as the rest of his troops arrived, but this only served to erode his combat power in piecemeal attacks. After providing Manstein with a stressful day, Lelyushenko broke off the attack at nightfall and fell back to defensive positions north of the city. By 30 June, Lelyushenko’s corps comprised only about 3,000 troops, seven BT-7s and forty-four artillery pieces.