However, in one of his more foolish strategic decisions, Hitler rejected the idea of evacuating Africa and instead ordered strong armoured reinforcements, including the refurbished 10.Panzer-Division and the newly-formed s.Panzer-Abteilung 501, to be transported to Tunisia to reinforce Rommel’s retreating forces. While this decision delayed the inevitable for five months, Hitler’s decision to send more than 300 tanks (including 31 Tigers) to Tunisia when the German Panzer-Divisionen in the East were reduced to threadbare strength represented a colossal mistake. Had these forces been sent eastward, von Manstein’s ‘Backhand Blow’ counter-offensive at Kharkov in February 1943 would have been nearly doubled in strength. Guderian opposed the diversion of this much armour to North Africa, particularly the Tigers, but he was ignored. Instead, by May 1943 all these reinforcements sent to North Africa would be eliminated, costing Germany three Panzer-Divisionen and a Panzergrenadier-Division, losses that would also have to be replaced out of hide. Like Stalingrad, German losses in North Africa were 100 per cent of equipment. Only small numbers of Panzertruppen were evacuated by air.
Diversion of Armour to the Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe
While the Heer panzer units were being bled to death in Russia and were often forced to make do with obsolete weapons, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler successfully lobbied Hitler to divert an enormous amount of men and equipment to convert three of his own Waffen-SS divisions to Panzergrenadier-Divisionen. Up to this point in the war, the Waffen-SS divisions had served as motorized infantry units, each with a battery of attached assault guns, and had limited experience with armoured operations. In 1942 the SS-
There is no doubt that the I.SS-Panzerkorps was a powerful strike force, but the amount of effort put into creating it was enormously detrimental to the revitalization of the Heer Panzer-Divisionen; the Germans were robbing from Peter to pay Paul. Furthermore, it is important to note that at the start of 1943 the Heer had far more experience with the use of tanks in combined arms warfare than the Waffen-SS commanders, who had no direct experience with leading large tank formations. Instead, the Waffen-SS simply appropriated experienced tankers from the Heer as needed; for example, Oberst Herbert Vahl, commander of the Panzer-Regiment 29, was transferred to take over the SS-