Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

Not to be outdone by Himmler, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring lobbied to get the Luftwaffe’s Division Hermann Göring converted into a Panzer-Division; by late 1942 this plan was a reality and the division sent a regimental-size Kampfgruppe to Tunisia. In short order this unit was destroyed, but the rest of the division fitted out in Italy. Like the Waffen-SS units, Göring ensured that his new division was provided with a two-battalion Panzer-Regiment and that it only received new-build tanks. However, Göring did not get authorization for Tiger tanks for the HG Division, and instead it received its own Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung. Since the Luftwaffe had virtually no officers or troops experienced in armoured combat, Göring used his influence to pressure the Heer into transferring a number of experienced panzer crews to the new outfit. Thus, between the Waffen-SS and the Luftwaffe, Germany had to find the resources to create eight new Panzer-Abteilungen – a total of over 420 tanks and assault guns. Like Himmler, Göring was not satisfied with controlling a single Panzer-Division and would soon be lobbying for more – all to the detriment of the Heer Panzer-Divisionen at the front. In March 1943, Guderian visited the Hermann Göring Division and was incensed to discover that the Luftwaffe had gathered 34,000 troops into this formation. Guderian later wrote that, ‘the majority of this large number of men were leading a pleasant life in Holland. In view of our replacement problem this was intolerable, even in 1943.’⁸ Nevertheless, Guderian utterly failed to prevent either the Waffen-SS or the Luftwaffe from diverting resources from his programme of revitalizing the Heer Panzer-Divisionen.

German Tactical and Doctrinal Changes

The German Bewegungskrieg (manoeuvre warfare) doctrine that had worked so well during 1940–42 was built around a combined arms team comprised of tanks, mechanized infantry, motorized engineers, self-propelled artillery and other elements, supported by abundant Luftwaffe close air support. In operational terms, the German preference for Bewegungskrieg was to conduct deliberate offensives under the most favourable circumstances – i.e. with full-strength units in fair weather. German armoured strength was to be applied to enemy weakness – an open or vulnerable flank or a poorly-guarded sector like the Ardennes – in order to achieve overwhelming combat power at the Schwerpunkt or decisive point. By focusing priority of tactical effort against a single Schwerpunkt, a decisive breakthrough could be achieved and the mechanized forces would pour into the enemy’s rear and then envelop his main body. After that, it was merely a matter of mopping up the encircled enemy in a Kessel (cauldron) battle.

While the Germans were able to achieve this standard with Operation Barbarossa in 1941, and with Fridericus, Trappenjagd and Blau in 1942, by 1943 the Germans were being forced to violate their own doctrine and conduct offensives without proper combined arms tactics and with less regard for the Schwerpunkt concept. During Operation Wintergewitter, the Stalingrad relief effort in December 1942, Hoth’s panzers had attacked with virtually no infantry and negligible air support. From that point onward, Soviet offensives would force the Germans to mount major armoured operations in winter until the end of the war – usually to save encircled units – and typically conducted as hasty attacks with understrength units. By mid-February 1943, von Manstein would be forced to conduct counter-attacks with Heer Panzer-Divisionen that had been reduced to fewer than a dozen operational tanks and this tended to become increasingly commonplace throughout much of 1943. The necessity of conducting mobile operations even in winter and under less-than-favourable circumstances led to doctrinal modifications.